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Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada

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A content analysis of material generated by the 1994–1995 foreign policy review process in Canada was conducted in an effort to understand how culture came to be officially constituted as the third pillar of Canadian foreign policy. The analysis showed significant differences among actors in terms of modes of legitimization of cultural diplomacy. State agents, by refusing to consider culture as a referent object in a broadened notion of security and by assimilating it into a system of civic values, resisted pressures from academics and groups that favored introducing societal conceptions of culture as relevant for the making of foreign policy. The result is nevertheless a new, albeit defensive and still ambiguous, form of implication of foreign policy in the cultural mission of the state in Canada.

KEY WORDS: globalization, cultural diplomacy, cultural insecurity, Canadian foreign policy, cultural policy.

The place of culture within state foreign policy has changed considerably in recent years. Until quite recently, cultural diplomacy essentially involved strengthening a country's cultural influence by funding artists' tours or by promoting the study of the country's language and culture in universities abroad (Mitchell, 1986). The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was then the multilateral arena within which each state could promote, with East-West and North-South ideological struggles in the background, its particular contribution to humanity's cultural heritage. The situation is quite different today. The international cultural agenda is now structured more by the challenges faced by each culture in the age of globalization, as cultural products are increasingly swept into the transnational communication and economic flows. To be culturally powerful—or even culturally significant—in today's world, a country must exercise control over these flows (Nye & Owens, 1996; Rothkopf, 1997), which are
increasing in tandem with the development of new information and communication
technologies (NICTs) and trade liberalization (Kaplan, 1994; Shao, 1995).

This study springs from the idea that this new mission significantly challenges
how the relationship between foreign policy and culture is customarily defined and
legitimated. The old vision of foreign policy as the expression of an independent
cultural reality is omnipresent in political discourse, where it contributes to the
reification of the national character of this cultural reality, and to the legitimization
of foreign policy as the expression of a national interest profoundly rooted in some
cultural common denominator. This idea has been echoed in various ways by the
dominant academic approaches to the study of foreign policy. Thus, from Almond’s
(1950) notion of “national character,” through a panoply of “belief systems” and
“strategic cultures” (see Hudson, 1997; Katzenstein, 1996), and up to Bloom’s
(1990) idea of the “dynamic of national identity,” foreign policy analysis has
essentially considered culturally related phenomena as independent of foreign
policy. The new international cultural agenda is transforming this relationship
between culture and foreign policy. The state’s cultural mission on the international
scene no longer simply entails promoting an already existing culture abroad. It
involves a more visibly active role in protecting and developing national culture,
with such goals as seeking cultural exemption provisions in trade agreements or
gaining access to a foreign partner’s telecommunications network. How then is
foreign policy adapting to this new situation? Is there resistance to this new role?
Does it generate new demands from the state and civil society? In this paper I would
like to explore these questions.

Before going any further, one possible misunderstanding needs to be cleared
up. This article does not seek to address the problem of the “ politicization” of
culture by foreign policy, even though this is the classic question addressed by
analysts who have studied cultural diplomacy (Mitchell, 1986). Cultural diplomacy
has never been apolitical, even if in general, and quite naturally, it claims to be so.
States that have made culture the “third pillar” of their foreign policy, beside
security and the economy, have clearly been more inspired by the type of realpolitik
precepts of cultural imperialism and the virtues of a policy of prestige espoused by
Morgenthau (1978, pp. 64–67, 77–91) than by the idea of fostering peace through
culture. And although UNESCO was built on the principle that cultural activities
should be independent of politics, it has only partially and temporarily succeeded
in resisting state-led politicization (Bekri, 1991).

Thus, the issue I address here is not the politicization of cultural diplomacy,
but rather how the linkages between culture and foreign policy are changing in a
context of growing cultural insecurity. In the past, foreign policy made “ instrumen-
tal” use of culture to support generally political and economic objectives, whereas
today it finds itself in the often uncomfortable position of having to openly
intervene in the cultural sphere.
Therefore, my aim is to understand how foreign policy is dealing with this new agenda, on the basis of a case study involving the place of culture within the 1994–1995 Canadian foreign policy review process.

**A SOCIETAL SECURITY APPROACH**

In this paper, I use a “societal security” approach, developed mainly by scholars associated with the “Copenhagen school” of International Relations (see Huysmans, 1998), to examine the problem of the relationship between foreign policy and culture (Buzan, 1991, 1993; Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaître, Tromer, & Waever, 1990; Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998; Waever, 1993). What distinguishes this approach from most other frameworks used in studies of the political impact of globalization (see Badie & Smouts, 1992; Featherstone, 1990; King, 1997; Rosenau, 1990) is that it proposes an understanding of the evolution of the state’s role in a context of cultural penetration that takes into consideration the articulation of the different conceptions of security coexisting in a given society. Like other approaches, the societal security approach recognizes that the forms of expression of identity within societies affected by globalization can sometimes give rise to disputes over the statist model of political organization. However—and this can be seen as a constructivist stand—it does not assume a priori that, under international and transnational pressure, there is an inevitable disconnection of the logics of sovereignty and identity.

The societal security approach has not given rise to empirical studies that deal specifically with state action in the cultural domain. It has instead been largely concerned with migration policies. Nonetheless, the approach provides an interpretive model of state behavior in the face of cultural penetration that can be adapted to the topic of the present study. The essential thrust of the societal security approach can be summarized as follows: The principal impact of the cultural aspects of globalization on political societies is that it generates a fundamental redefinition of the problem of security. Although the growing interpenetration of states in the political, military, economic, and even environmental spheres is giving rise to new forms of external threats, these threats are part of the challenge to state sovereignty—that is, to a government’s ability to exercise control over its own territory and institutions. In contrast, cultural interpenetration, whether it takes the form of migration or overriding cultural influence from a dominant culture, engenders threats both real and perceived, not to state sovereignty but to the identity of societies—that is, the sense of belonging or the mode of subjectivization of a society.

Of course, sovereignty and identity are interrelated, if only to the extent that certain societal identities develop concomitantly with state-building. Nonetheless, the idea here is that a societal identity can be reproduced independently of a state and even in opposition to a state mode of political organization (Waever, 1993,
p. 23). Similarly, the legitimacy of the state is neither exclusively nor necessarily founded on social identity. Thus, even though it has the potential to be so, a threat to identity is neither directly nor necessarily a threat to sovereignty, and vice versa.

It follows that the threat posed by cultural penetration produces a duality in the way the question of security is tackled—state security versus societal security. Both the advent and form of this duality are dependent in each case on the nature of the threat, but above all the connection or absence of connection between state and societal security depends on the strategic configuration of the actors who will benefit from playing on feelings of insecurity. In this sense, it is clear that both insecurity and security are always subjective constructions used by political actors (Campbell, 1992, 1993). As Waever (1993) put it, “Of course, the rhetoric of security will often be employed in cases where survival, whether of sovereignty or identity, is not actually threatened, but where it is possible to legitimate political action by making reference to such a threat” (p. 26). This process, by which a referent object is admitted to be existentially threatened, will here be referred to as “securization” (Buzan et al., 1998, chapter 2).

For the purposes of this paper, the discussion above suggests a number of general assumptions regarding the effect of globalization on the cultural foreign policy of states. The first and most obvious assumption is that the primary effect of globalization will be to put foreign policy under pressure to devise and implement its cultural activities within a logic of security. The second is that these pressures will not come from the state itself, but from societal actors or groups acting on the basis of their own self-interests. The third assumption is that the impact that these pressures have on foreign cultural policy will in each case depend on a number of key intervening factors, the most important of which will undoubtedly be the type of compatibility that exists between state and societal modes of legitimization. In this respect, it can be reasonably expected, for example, that in a multiethnic state there will be greater resistance to attempts to “securitize” culture—that is, to broaden definitions of security to include a societal dimension—than in a more truly national state.

THE CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW PROCESS:
OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT

In recent years, many countries have felt the need to readjust the objectives of cultural diplomacy to the new international reality (Juppé, 1994; Ninkovich, 1996; Werz, 1992). Among the possible cases that might be studied, Canada’s was particularly interesting because, during 1994–1995, it carried out an extensive foreign policy review during which cultural questions received unprecedented attention (Canada, 1994b). Indeed, these questions were given a new place in the official foreign policy of the government, which decided to make culture the third pillar of its foreign policy (Canada, 1995a). Some experts have underlined the
novelty of this invasion of culture in the debate surrounding the review process, pointing to the presence of an effort to link cultural questions to the issue of "security." For example, Janice Stein, who observed the review process very closely, noted a degree of consensus between the views of the pressure groups devoted to defending culture and those of the political decision-makers on the need to conceive of culture in terms of national security (Stein, 1994–95, pp. 56–60). Whereas Stein seemed to doubt the viability of such an approach, John Kirton (1996, p. 270) considered that the emphasis put on themes such as cultural security, when accompanied by a repudiation of the traditional liberal concepts of sovereignty and interdependence (as is the case in the new policy), indicates a major change in the direction of Canadian foreign policy. Even though Canadian foreign policy experts see this phenomenon as important, it has not been, to our knowledge, the subject of a systematic analysis.1 Moreover, the relative openness of the 1994–1995 review process provides an exceptional field of observation for those who seek to understand how Canada’s diplomatic priorities were chosen, because it is possible to isolate the contributions of different types of actors (see Sylvan, Stein, & Thorson, 1996).

Before turning to a more detailed description of the 1994–1995 review, it is first necessary to put the process into context. It should be stressed that this was not the first time that the question of "cultural sovereignty" had been part of political debate in Canada. Indeed, since its birth, Canada has constantly been concerned with protecting itself against the enormous degree of penetration of its society by American culture, a concern manifested in protectionist measures (e.g., tariff barriers on cultural products, the imposition of quotas regarding Canadian content on radio and television broadcasters, restrictions on the foreign ownership of cultural industries) as well as measures to support cultural endeavors and their diffusion in Canada (e.g., the creation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Canada Council for the Arts; Thompson, 1994). However, these measures essentially were a matter of domestic policy. Although the reports of the various federal commissions on culture made recommendations affecting cultural diplomacy, they were generally implemented by bodies outside the Department of Foreign Affairs (Cooper, 1985; Shroeder-Gudehus, 1989). All things considered, the cultural component of Canada’s foreign policy never really developed, thereby leaving the field open to the provinces in particular (Bélanger, 1994). Thus, before 1995, culture had never figured as a priority in any foreign policy statement by the Canadian government (Kirton, 1996, p. 262).

The foreign policy review process therefore took place in a context that was relatively closed with regard to cultural diplomacy. Nor did the government appear to want to change this situation, for it did not broach the question in its guidelines

1 But John Hay, an editorialist at the Ottawa Citizen, has written an informed and interesting account of the ways by which culture has found its place in the new policy (Hay, 1995).
to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Canada, 1994a, pp. 35–37). However, in a wider context, the review process took place at a time when a growing concern over American cultural penetration was emerging in Canada. In the early 1990s, two events catalyzed this concern, which, kindled by the representatives of cultural industries, has continued to grow ever since. One was the coming into effect of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the other was what is commonly referred to as the “Sports Illustrated Affair.”

In the case of the FTA, Canadians soon realized that Article 2005 of the agreement [reproduced in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)], which had been portrayed as a “cultural exemption” provision, in fact allowed the United States to take countervailing measures if Canadian cultural policies were considered to discriminate against the United States, and thus to put pressure on the Canadian government to abolish protectionist measures (Berier & Malepart, 1994). The Sports Illustrated Affair was touched off in 1993 when the magazine’s publisher undertook to print the Canadian edition in Canada, although the magazine’s content would be sent to the printer electronically from the American head office. Because the magazine would not cross the border physically, it would avoid Canadian protectionist measures (such as minimum requirements for Canadian editorial content) that grant the right to certain tax advantages and lower postal rates. The Canadian government reacted by strengthening its regulations. This policy was immediately contested by the United States, thus launching a commercial war that has not yet been settled. It became obvious that the future of the Canadian system for protecting cultural industries was being threatened, both by the new communication technologies and by trade liberalization. From that point on, the issue of culture became, definitively, a foreign policy issue.

With respect to the domestic political context, the foreign policy review took place at a time when the debate over Canadian unity was becoming increasingly polarized. In 1993, after the failure of two successive attempts to reshape the constitution in a way that would be acceptable to Quebec, French-speaking Quebecers elected enough members of the secessionist party, Bloc Québécois, for it to become the Official Opposition in the federal parliament. While the work of the Special Joint Committee was going on at the federal level, at the provincial level in Quebec City the Parti Québécois (PQ) was taking over the reins of power.

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2 Indeed, the only mention of culture in the guidelines was the government’s request that the Committee analyze, among other factors transforming the international environment, “the causes of, and the problems associated with, the rise of culture and ethnicity as bases for political organization” (Canada, 1994b, p. 35).

3 The current 1982 Constitution was adopted without Quebec’s consent. The Meech Lake (1987) and Charlottetown (1992) constitutional agreements were endorsed by the Quebec government. However, the ratification procedure of the former failed and the second was rejected in a referendum by the citizens of both Quebec and the other Canadian provinces.
Redefining Cultural Diplomacy

from the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP). Moreover, the federal government unveiled its new foreign policy at a time when Quebec was undergoing an extensive pre-referendum consultation process on Quebec sovereignty, culminating in the referendum held on 30 October 1995.4

Thus, it was in this context that the foreign policy review process took place, a process that can be broken down into five parts:

The government’s initiative. In March 1994, the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented a motion in the House of Commons proposing that a Special Joint Committee to review Canadian foreign policy be formed. The Minister’s motion defined the Committee’s mandate and was accompanied by guidelines describing the directions that the government wanted to see adopted by the Committee.

The consultation process. The 7-month consultative process was conducted in the following more or less chronological stages:

1. Receipt of briefs: 561 briefs were sent to the Committee by various organizations, institutions, and groups.

2. Testimonies: The Committee divided into groups to hear those who submitted briefs.

3. Round tables: The committee organized 21 thematic round tables of experts.

4. Consultations abroad: The Committee traveled outside the country to meet Canada’s representatives abroad, as well as some representatives of foreign countries.

5. Position papers: The Committee commissioned four position papers from specialists in the field.

The public debate. Alongside the Committee’s deliberations, from the moment that the government announced its intention to undertake a reform of foreign policy, a number of actors in civil society sought to influence the work of the legislators and the government’s response. In particular, a group of academics and practitioners published a set of recommendations entitled Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century (Canada 21 Council, 1994), which had something of an impact on the debates. In April 1994, this same group organized a National Forum on Canada’s International Relations, which legislators and certain members of the government attended as observers.

The committee’s report. On 3 November 1994, the Committee adopted and made public its report entitled Canada’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future. The report was accompanied by dissenting opinions and recommendations by

4 The result of the October 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty was close (49.4% for the “Yes” side and 50.6% for the “No”). The current PQ government, reelected in 1998, promises another referendum on sovereignty as soon as “winning conditions” would materialize.
the Bloc Québécois and Reform Party members. One of the Committee’s
members, Reform Party MP Chuck Strahl, also wrote an individual dissenting
report.

The government’s response and policy statement. Finally, on 7 February
1995, the government made public its new foreign policy statement entitled
Canada in the World. It was accompanied by a government response to each of the
Committee’s recommendations.

METHOD: A QUALITATIVE/QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

How did culture come to be constituted as a subject of political concern, and
how did state and societal actors contribute to the definition of the new objectives
of Canadian foreign policy in the area of culture? In an effort to answer these
questions, I performed a content analysis of the material generated by the different
phases of the review process. Because an enormous amount of written material was
generated through the consultation process, a large part of which was not relevant
to this study, only those briefs and Committee hearing transcripts that addressed
issues related to culture were selected for the analysis.5

Most of the elements in the corpus were archived in a computerized data bank
on Canadian cultural diplomacy, and each text unit (i.e., paragraph) was coded
according to the basic parameters [nature of the document, date, origin, type of
actor (state, societal, expert, group, etc.)].6 The next step was to extract from this
database the units of analysis corresponding to those phases of the review process
for which a consistent and complete discourse was available—that is, the two
principal components of the consultative process (the briefs and the hearing
transcripts), the Committee report, and the government’s foreign policy statement.7
It was thus possible to isolate a set of 1,153 text units that were representative of

5 A preliminary, very open selection of briefs was made on the basis of a list of individuals and
organizations that had submitted a brief. This selection took into consideration the vocation of
organizations or individuals appearing on the list, mention of them in the summary document on
education and culture prepared for the Committee (Special Joint Committee, 1994), and reading of
the testimonies. The briefs submitted by groups and individuals appearing on the list were then read
in order to eliminate those that did not deal with the issue of culture at all. In total, 62 briefs were
retained for analysis. For the analysis of testimonies, 52 issue books that reproduced the public works
of the Committee were systematically studied (Senate and House of Commons, 1994). If an expert or
representative of an organization raised a question related to culture, his or her entire testimony was
retained as well as his or her exchanges with the Committee members. In total, 22 issue books were
retained for analysis, in whole or in part.

6 The software used was NUD*IST, version 4.

7 The separate government response was not incorporated into this data set because of the hybrid and
incomplete nature of the document (i.e., summing up of recommendations made by the committee and
government reactions).
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Table I. Culture in the Foreign Policy Review Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Briefs</th>
<th>Testimonies</th>
<th>Reports</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groups/organizations</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>248</td>
<td></td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>(12)*</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1,153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These units come from the testimony of David Johnston, president of the Information Highway Advisory Council. In charge of a federal government organization, Johnston belongs to a special category of government actor, but as his views do not commit the government as a whole, these units will not be taken into account in the tables that follow.

the process and in which the word "culture" occurred at least once (see Table I). This set was used to analyze the discourse on culture within the review process. Because the number of text units generated by the whole review process is unknown, it is impossible to compute percentages. But to give an idea of the relative position occupied by culture, we can say that out of 62 preselected briefs among the 561 the Committee claims to have received, 51 directly addressed "culture."

The data analysis involved identifying in the discourse how the different actors sought to define culture as a subject of intervention for foreign policy, paying particular attention to the relationship between security and culture. In successive stages, text units were classified with the use of a computer to gradually build up a number of categories of analysis and to see how they related to each other. The classifications were made according to a classic computer-aided qualitative analysis: On the basis of key words drawn from the text and relevant from the perspective of the theoretical framework, search operators were constructed and validated through successive rounds of continuous reading of the automatic classification results and adjustment of the operators. The final results were reviewed so as to eliminate the units that, despite the adjustments, met the automatic search criteria but had a different meaning from the one being researched (Belanger, 1996; Pfaffengerber, 1988; Roller, Mathes, & Eckert, 1995; Sylvan et al., 1996). As discussed below, the major analytical categories of interest were the form of cultural intervention (protection or projection) and the object of intervention

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8 The search operator "culture" was used—that is, the root of English and French words that are constructed with the noun "culture"—and units in which the prefix "agri" was found were removed from the result.

9 The Committee considered as a "brief" any communication from a group or individual, even a simple letter. Thus, the number 561 should be interpreted with caution.

10 The data set described in Table I includes contributions by 84 societal agents (63 representatives of groups or organizations and 21 experts) who expressed themselves through briefs or testimonies.
(culture as a finality of the action or as an instrument). On the basis of these
categories, a comparison was made, combining qualitative and quantitative obser-
vations (Huber, 1995), between the different types of actors who participated in
the process.

CULTURE AND SECURITY IN THE CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
REVIEW PROCESS

Examination of the elements that make up the government initiative shows
that only during the process did culture emerge as a concern. As was mentioned
earlier, there was no mention of culture in the government guidelines provided to
the committee. Similarly, the 1993 election platform of the Liberal Party of Canada
(LPC), to which the legislators were referred in the guidelines, did not discuss
culture in its chapter devoted to foreign policy. The most that the document
promised, in a section entitled “Strengthening Our Society,” was that “we will also
take measures to enable Canadian producers of cultural products to export their
work to international markets” (LPC, 1993, p. 89). Even the legislators did not seem
ready to talk about culture, as evidenced by the disjointed and rather impressionistic
nature of their comments during the Committee hearings. They were thus
catched unawares by the arguments of societal agents on cultural questions. This
was noted by an observer of the Committee’s proceedings (Stein, 1994–95,
pp. 56–60) and was confirmed in a briefing document prepared for legislators
(Special Joint Committee, 1994, pp. 179–184) as well as in an interview given
to John Hay (1995):

“With all other areas of the report,” in security, trade, development, “what
we came out of the process with was more or less what we came into the
process with,” recalled a senior adviser to the Committee. “In that sense,
the only thing that was truly learned in the course of the foreign policy
review was this,” the growing importance of cultural relations in foreign
policy. “It surprised everybody when it came up.” (p. 25)

It is clear, therefore, that culture was forced onto the agenda of the review process
by the societal agents, even if one acknowledges the role of some state agencies
like the Department of Foreign Affairs’ Cultural Relations Bureau in encouraging
groups and representatives from the cultural sector to participate in the process
(Hay, 1995, p. 28).

On the other hand, from the outset the theme of broadening the notion of
security was used as a focus for considering and redefining foreign policy. Not only
was this a central theme in the guidelines, it was also the subject of concerted
intervention by experts who tried very early in the process to organize a public
debate on foreign policy. Thus, the Canada 21 Council report structured all of
its recommendations around the rather vague concept of “common security.”
However, the members of this pressure group\textsuperscript{11} made a direct link between a broader notion of security and culture. According to the Council, the first of the four fundamental principles on which Canada should construct its foreign policy was as follows:

Common security depends not on cultural homogeneity, but on the ability to create the conditions of tolerance and respect where a multiplicity of cultures and communities can flourish. The enhancement of Canadian sovereignty, community and culture is, therefore, a contribution to common security. In the new era, the two tasks are inseparably joined. (Canada 21 Council, 1994, p. 12)

Thus, Canada 21 proposed a broadened conception of security that included culture and in general made room for societal security. Franklyn Griffiths, one of the expert advisors who had contributed to the work of Canada 21, developed the argument further in an article and in testimony before the Committee. Griffiths (1994) proposed in no uncertain terms a transition from a policy of military security to a policy of societal security:

The state of our cultural life becomes a key variable in our international security policy, in our survival as a people with the capacity to make autonomous choices in an interdependent world. Those who conceive of Canadian culture in terms of cultural industries, employment potential, and the like will be asked here to think again. Canadians will instead be invited to regard culture and cultural policy as fundamental in maintaining their country’s security in all its aspects, common security included. (p. 16)

It can therefore be said that, although the legislators lacked the precise concepts needed to develop their thinking on culture itself, they did have access to a concept of security that made room for culture. But even so, this concept had to correspond to the nature of the demands that were made by groups representing civil society. To evaluate the presence of concerns expressed in terms of protection of culture in the review process, and to compare these expressions with the traditional ones about projection of culture, I selected a subset of text units that mentioned culture, in which there were a number of key words associated with one conception or the other.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11}As mentioned earlier, this group consisted mainly of academics and public figures who saw in the arrival of a new Liberal government in Ottawa an opportunity to reorient Canadian foreign policy. Many of the participants were close to the Liberals or to their more nationalist ideology. For example, Pierre Petigrew, who co-chaired the council with University of Toronto political science professor Janice Stein, was later to become a member of the Cabinet.

\textsuperscript{12}The search patterns used were as follows: Projection = [cultur* LESS agri*] AND [projection/ projet/ projet/ to project/ prestige/ image/ à l’étranger/ à l’extérieur/ abroad/ réputation/ reputation/ promot*/ image du Canada/ Canada’s image/ rayonner/ rayonnement/ diffusion]
Table II. Interventions to Protect or Project Culture, by Actor Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Number of</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number of</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>Projection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal agents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State agents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary committee</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The views of organizations and experts were expressed in briefs and testimony at Committee hearings. The views of individual legislators were expressed at the hearings. The government and the committee expressed their views in their policy statements.

Table II shows that the traditional conception of cultural diplomacy as an instrument for projecting culture still dominates political discourse, whereas cultural protection occupies a less significant place. Among societal agents, experts were relatively more concerned about protection than were groups. This is less than surprising in that many of the groups appeared before the Committee to ask that the existing dissemination programs (from which they benefit) be maintained or improved. Indeed, only seven groups presented culture as something to be

The following excerpt from the brief submitted by the Professional Art Dealers Association of Canada provides an example of a unit of analysis corresponding to the "projection" category: “This brief is being submitted to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Canadian Foreign Policy in order to insure that cultural issues, and specifically issues relating to the visual arts, are included when reviewing our Canadian presence abroad. The promotion of Canadian interests strategically abroad, whether they be business, political, or cultural interests, should be tied together interactively and in a unified manner. Our culture is the basic reflection of our national identity, and therefore our sovereignty and pride. We must exhibit a commitment to enhancing the unique aspects of our cultural life and developing the practical initiatives required in order to project them effectively abroad.”

Protection = \textit{[cultur* LESS agri*]} AND \textit{[protection/ protecting/ protectionnisme/ protectionisme/ proteger/ protect/ defense/ defense/ securite/ security/ menace/ threat/ survie/ survival/ surviving/ survivit/ survivre/ survive/ danger/ vulnerabilite/ vulnerability]}

The following excerpt from the testimony given by Mireille Gagnée, representative of the Canadian Music Centre and of Conseil québécois de la musique, is an example of a unit of text corresponding to the “protection” research format: “Ce qui nous amène à répondre à la première question de votre interrogation ici, en disant que le bouleversement des télécommunications fait partie des changements majeurs qui se dessinent à l’aube du XXIe siècle, et que la protection des arts et de la culture doit être une action prioritaire d’un gouvernement responsable. L’affirmation d’identité d’un pays ne relève-t-elle pas du gouvernement? Tous les pays en ont une, et il est de leur devoir de la faire connaître, respecter et même apprécier.”
protected, whereas 27 emphasized projection. On this issue, societal agents originating from French-speaking Québec did not behave differently from the others.\textsuperscript{13}

An examination of the data on “state” actors in Table II shows that the Committee somewhat amplified in its report the language of cultural projection and protection used by societal agents during the consultation. But the government’s treatment of cultural questions in its policy statement clearly did not match the enthusiasm of the Committee for such discourse. Moreover, a comparison of the parliamentary and government discourse on these two themes reveals significant qualitative differences. First, the Committee’s concern about protection was mainly expressed in the chapter of its report dealing with culture and education and in the chapter on Canada’s place in the world, which focused on its relationship with the United States. The government referred directly to the protection of culture only in the introduction to the policy statement, and not at all in the chapter devoted to culture and Canadian values. Second, the Committee, noting that “[a] country cannot project its arts, culture and knowledge if it does not produce and subsequently distribute them” (Canada, 1994b, p. 66), consciously blurred the line between domestic and foreign policy by proposing that cultural foreign policy should be conceived as an integral part of a cultural development strategy of the state that would encompass regulating, subsidizing, producing, and distributing Canadian culture.\textsuperscript{14} The government, for its part, simply acknowledged in general terms that “countries are looking for the appropriate balance between openness to international culture and support for their own cultures to protect and enhance local identity and diversity” (Canada, 1995a, p. 4). Thus, the government did not appear to be ready to support the Committee’s desire to see foreign policy play a more active role in cultural development and fell back on a more traditional foreign policy approach to culture.

On the other hand, there was a marked convergence in the positions expressed by all the state actors with respect to the evolution, during the review process, of the articulation of culture and a broadened conception of security. This evolution can be seen as a gradual weeding out of all references with a societal connotation in the definition of the new security agenda. Although the Committee’s report adopted the expression “common security” proposed by the Canada 21 Council

\textsuperscript{13} The score for groups and experts from Québec was Protection, 14 units (4.5%); Projection, 51 units (16.3%).

\textsuperscript{14} Among the specific recommendations, one can read: “Such a strategy should consider regulations and other means, including joint ventures with the private sector, of producing and distributing Canadian cultural output at home and abroad. . . . The government should seek alliances with like-minded countries in future international negotiations to recognize the need to protect and promote national cultures. The Committee also recommends that the Government of Canada dedicate itself to the promotion of a vibrant Canadian culture by increasing its support for creative artists and creative scholars and to the development of the means necessary for the distribution at home and abroad of what these artists and scholars create” (Canada, 1994b, pp. 69–70).
and used it as a key concept in its foreign policy proposal, it opted for a newly articulated definition of the concept—inspired by the report of the National Forum on Canada’s International Relations—that limits the new sectors to be securitized to the economy, the environment, and human rights\(^{15}\) (Canada, 1994b, pp. 11–12; National Forum, 1994, p. 3). Thus, the cultural dimension no longer comes within the compass of the enlarged conception of security, even though the language of cultural security occasionally resurfaces in the report, particularly in the chapter on culture and education. In the government statement, another new concept—shared human security—comes to delineate the broader notion of security. Clearly, the cultural (or indeed societal) dimension of security is exorcised by the notion of shared human security, which refers to the physical, economic, and legal security of the \textit{person}.\(^{16}\) This shows an interesting willingness to dissociate foreign policy from the societal security agenda and to instead ground it in the “political” (or statist) security agenda, even if this new agenda is presented as a departure from traditional state-centric conceptions of security. As Buzan et al. (1998) have argued,

> Among the principles that can be securitized [in the “political” sector] are human rights and other demands relating directly to the condition of individuals; thus this sector is probably the primary locus at which (seemingly) individual-level security appears on the security agenda.

(p. 141)

Hence, what we have here is a clear case of duality in the way the question of security is addressed, with societal security being pushed aside from the foreign policy security agenda. This happens concomitantly with a resistance, if not a refusal, by the government to accept a more direct role for foreign policy in the cultural development strategy of the state. It thus appears that in the Canadian case, where different competing “national” identities coexist in the same state, there is a strong resistance to modify the way foreign policy officially relates to culture. Moreover, in adopting a “shared human security” agenda, the central government now openly distances its foreign policy from societal concerns. It is noteworthy in this respect that the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, who until recently presented in his speeches the new Canadian security agenda as a shift of concern “from

\(^{15}\) A collective dimension of security considered by the forum, but used by neither the committee nor the government, was that of “healthy public management” (National Forum, 1994, p. 3).

\(^{16}\) “Serious long term challenges are posed by environmental, demographic, health and development issues around the globe. Some of these challenges—such as global warming—could affect us directly. Others may provoke crises producing humanitarian tragedies, epidemics, mass migrations, and other problems from which, even if half a world away, Canada will not be immune. Still others may result in the adoption abroad of policies that ultimately degrade our economic security by undercutting labour, health, environmental or other international standards. All of this demands a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow orientation of managing state-to-state relationships, to one that recognizes the importance of the individual and society for our shared security” (Canada, 1995b, p. 25).
the state to the community, and even the individual" (Axworthy, 1998b, p. 3), no longer refers to the community: "Our basic unit of analysis in security matters has shrunk from the state to the individual" (Axworthy, 1998a, p. 1).

Looking more closely at the data, it can be seen that the problem of security was seen very differently by the societal actors and the state actors during the review process. For example, the particular threats referred to by the various actors when they addressed cultural protection (Table III) reveal that societal agents tend to identify threats that affect culture directly (e.g., globalization, NICTs, and the difficulty of gaining access to foreign markets), whereas state agents (i.e., essentially legislators) emphasize the political expression of cultural threats (e.g., American hegemony and trade agreements, particularly NAFTA). In other words, legislators are more likely than the government to make cultural protection a foreign policy objective, but the threat they wish to counter is a threat to the power and sovereignty of the Canadian state, especially vis-à-vis the United States, and not to culture itself, which is what societal agents seek to defend.

The relative preponderance of threats that affect culture directly over more political forms of threats in the discourse of societal agents is also evident in Table IV, which shows the threats identified by groups and experts who made pronouncements on culture when referring to protection. The difference from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Number of text units referring to protection of culture</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>3 3 1 1 2 0 3 1 1 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>3 3 2 0 0 2 2 0 1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>6 6 3 1 2 2 5 1 2 3 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators</td>
<td>0 0 5 1 0 0 1 0 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary committee</td>
<td>0 0 2 4 0 0 1 0 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1 0 7 5 0 1 3 0 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7 6 10 6 2 3 5 4 2 5 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Threat codes**

1. Globalization
2. New information and communication technologies
3. American hegemony
4. Trade agreements
5. Pirating copyrights
6. Changes in the international order
7. Lack of access to foreign markets
8. Leveling homogenization
9. Poor government policy
10. Other threats
11. No threat

*Note.* Because more than one threat may be mentioned in one unit of analysis, the total number of units is slightly higher than the total in the "protection" category (55).
Table IV. Threats, by Actor Type (II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal agents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37^a</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. See Table III for threat codes.

*aBecause the threats identified here are less directly associated with culture (see footnote 17), it was predictable that we would encounter a wider variety of “Other” threats, from “underdevelopment” to “racial tensions.”

Table III is that here all the text units making reference to protection by these agents are counted, even if they do not immediately match with text units mentioning culture. Once again, references to globalization and NICTs are dominant, with groups appearing to be more preoccupied by the first threat and experts by the second. However, as important as globalization for the experts are political expressions of threat: American hegemony, trade agreements, and changes in the international order. It thus seems that those experts who tried to operate an analytical linkage between culture and a broadened notion of security were still thinking and presenting the issue of security in political terms. If so, were they asking primarily for the protection of culture, or for the protection of the Canadian political entity through culture?

This brings us to the question of whether culture is considered a means or an end of foreign policy. To determine whether the actors involved in the review process approached the question of culture as an end (i.e., the societal conception of security) or as an instrument for achieving noncultural goals (e.g., employment creation, increasing Canada’s prestige abroad, preserving Canadian independence, etc.), I used search operators to isolate a number of text units that refer to culture.

Table V shows that groups more frequently valued culture as an instrument than as a finality of foreign policy action, whereas experts presented a balanced vision. A more in-depth analysis shows that on the whole, when instrumentality is

^17In other words, what links protection to culture here is the fact that the references to protection selected are the ones made by the 63 groups and 21 experts who participated in the discussion on culture, and not the concordance of “protection” and “culture” word patterns in the same paragraph. Because what is done here is an association between a specific locutor and his/her propensity to talk or write about culture, it would not have been useful to apply the same measurement to state agents because they mainly expressed themselves collectively.

^18The search patterns used were as follows: Finality = [cultur* LESS agri*] AND [culture canadienne/Canadian culture/identit6 culturelle/cultural identity/identité/ valeur/value]. Instrumentality = [cultur* LESS agri*] AND [strength/force/power/puissance/présence/presence/souveraineté/sovereignty/trade/commerce/economy/économie].
referred to, it is mainly based on economic goals (67% of units in the “instrumentality” category include references to the economy), but experts were more likely to emphasize the contribution of culture to reinforcing the power and political status of Canada than were groups active in the cultural field, which tried to legitimize more governmental intervention by making references to economic profitability. Note also that societal agents from Quebec appeared to be proportionally less instrumentalist than the whole, with 17 units falling in the “finality” category and 16 in the “instrumentality” category (both representing 5% of the total). In contrast, societal agents from English-speaking Ontario were more instrumentalist, with scores of 7 to 18 (6% and 15% of the units, respectively).

It can also be seen from Table V that, although during the hearings legislators clearly focused more attention on culture as a finality (24 units) than as an instrument of foreign policy action (9 units), the instrumental vision dominated in their report (12 vs. 4 units). This is in line with our earlier finding that, even though a societal conception of cultural security emerged during the consultative process, by the end of the process the role of culture in foreign policy had clearly come to be conceived in terms of its contribution to the country’s economic and political security.

There was a balance between instrumentality and finality in the government’s discourse. However, the government’s definition of culture had little in common with the notion of culture that underlay the debate among participants in the consultation process. In fact, the government discourse shifted the meaning of culture by defining it as a set of political values rather than as an artistic and intellectual reality with which a community identifies: “Our principles and values—our culture—are rooted in a commitment to tolerance; to democracy; to equality and to human rights; etc.” (Canada, 1995a, p. 9). This assimilation of culture into a system of values is especially obvious in the chapter entitled “Projecting Canadian
Values and Culture," which emphasizes the quality of the civic values embodied in Canadian culture, such as tolerance, bilingualism, and multiculturalism (Canada, 1995a, p. 43). Again, as in the case of the shift form "common" to "human" security, the result here is that culture is emptied of its societal significance, which is replaced by more "political" or statist content. As a foreign policy referent object, culture has lost societal meaning.

**INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the recent Canadian foreign policy review process that support, albeit with qualifications, the initial assumptions of this study. First, the examination of the process revealed that Canadian foreign policy was effectively subjected to strong pressures from civil society to make culture a key instrument in confronting the challenges posed by globalization. In line with the analysis set out above, one of the ways that was proposed to integrate culture into Canadian foreign policy was to include culture in a broader, redefined notion of security and in the policies flowing from such a redefinition. This proposition was more coherently expressed by the experts who participated in the consultation process, but it was also in line with some of the concerns expressed by groups representing the cultural milieu. The role played by experts is overlooked in the analytical framework based on the societal security approach, and it is clear that this weakness must be remedied in future studies. This could be done by drawing on research on the role of epistemic communities in the formulation of foreign policy (Haas, 1997; Sylvan et al., 1996).

As for the apparent hesitation of the groups to fully embrace the securization rhetoric put forward by the experts, it may be grounded in a critical and strategic evaluation of the consequences of entering this path. Artists and cultural activists can be tempted by the mobilization potential that can result from linking fears about cultural domination and assimilation with the strong and evocative language of security. But by adopting such a strategy, as Daniel Deudney (1990) has argued in the case of similar uses of security references by environmentalists, they run the risk of finding themselves embarked on a national security discourse and logic of action that undercuts a more globalist understanding of their condition and activism. Variations on this dilemma have effectively been voiced by group representatives during a meeting paralleling an international conference on cooperation in cultural policy held in Ottawa in June 1998,19 and this will be the object of further investigations in the next stage of this project.

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19 On-the-spot observation. The conference was a Canadian initiative, but interestingly the host was the Minister of Canadian Heritage and not the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Canadian Conference of the Arts organized the parallel "civil society" meeting, which attracted a small number of foreign NGOs, in close cooperation with the Department of Canadian Heritage.
The analysis reveals, moreover, that the desire to include culture as a field of foreign policy intervention met with resistance on the part of state agents. Although the government, in the face of an onslaught of pressure, was forced to resolve to make culture a new priority of its international activities, the analysis shows that it was done at the price of instrumentalizing culture and assimilating it, to a certain degree, into a system of civic principles and values. The watering down of the scope of the government’s cultural commitment in the area of foreign policy also took the form of excluding culture from the new, broadened notion of security. To use the language of the societal security approach, the government’s reaction, taken as a whole, clearly denoted a reluctance to break with an essentially statist conception of security in favor of a societal conception. It would therefore seem premature to interpret this cultural commitment as signaling a rupture with Canadian diplomacy’s tradition of liberal internationalism (Kirton, 1996). The Canadian political context, characterized as it is by conflict over identity, probably makes it difficult to reconcile the societal and state logics of security.

We are thus able to see how, in the Canadian case, foreign policy orientations are shaped by the process of security “dualization” induced by globalization. Canadian state agents resist the securization, at the foreign policy level, of societal referent objects like “culture.” But in doing so, they do not leave Canadian foreign policy unaltered: The broadening of the security agenda has been expurgated of collective referents, thus confining the notion of “human security” to parameters that remain consonant with state security despite the claim of emancipation from the state reference; culture has nevertheless been promoted as the third pillar of Canadian foreign policy, albeit not without confusion about the new mission and its object. In turn, and perhaps of more importance from a foreign policy analysis point of view, even if this is done defensively and whatever the final result, we must acknowledge that foreign policy does play an active role in the redefinition of the culture-state relation in Canada and of “culture” as a referent object of collective action.

Clearly, foreign policy has been brought into the political debate on the cultural mission of the state in an era of globalization and on the opportunity to securitize culture. The response of foreign policy agents to this involvement probably had an impact on how Canadians think of their culture and its political significance, on how the state is conceiving its cultural mission, and ultimately on culture as such. We can thus no longer be satisfied with analytical models that assume culture to be independent of foreign policy, especially if we want to further explore the implications of security dualization for foreign policy conduct and legitimization. One way to correct this could be to consider culture and foreign policy as mutually constitutive, and to use dynamic models of the kind proposed by Carlsnaes (1992) in order to control “feedforward” effects from foreign policy to culture.

From a more practical angle, it remains to be seen whether the state of affairs at the conclusion of the review process will meet the expectations of groups within Canadian civil society and of the state itself. One possible hypothesis is that the
tension between the state and societal conceptions of the relationship between culture and foreign policy, as revealed in the present study of the review process, has increased since 1995. As for the Department of Foreign Affairs, there is still uncertainty as to how the policy statement should be followed up. One report, commissioned to the former Liberal Minister Serge Joyal and recommending that all of the government’s international activities be consolidated under one department, has been shelved (Joyal, 1994). For now, the new cultural mandate has not generated much from Foreign Affairs, except for confusion and bureaucratic resistance (Hay, 1995, pp. 31–32). It is interesting that within the government the torch of cultural sovereignty is carried, domestically as well as internationally, by the Heritage Department, while the Minister of International Trade ponders, quite openly, the advisability of maintaining the current regime of cultural protectionism in an era of trade liberalization (Eggleton, 1997). Meanwhile, the Canadian cultural sector is continuing to demand a more aggressive external cultural policy (Conférence Canadienne des Arts, 1998; New Conversations, 1996). Moreover, their demands are often couched in the rhetoric of societal security, as in a recent report by the Canadian Conference of the Arts, which, while seeming to respond to the broader notion of “human security” promoted by Canadian foreign policy, states: “It is just as important to preserve cultural pluralism as biodiversity or the environment” (Conférence Canadienne des Arts, 1998, p. 25; our translation).

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