Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions

JAVIER CORRALES
Amherst College

AND

RICHARD E. FEINBERG
University of California, San Diego

The 1994 Summit of the Americas marked a high point in hemisphericism—our label for the active attempt by the nations of the Western Hemisphere to form regimes of cooperation with one another. To explain why hemisphericism has not been a more powerful trend in the last 200 years, structural, interest, and cultural variables are relevant but insufficient factors. An important and often overlooked obstacle to hemisphericism has been contrarian ideas. Specifically, constellations of intellectual traditions that question the value of hemispheric cooperation have dampened both the demand for and supply of such regimes. Only when these antihemispheric intellectual traditions were in retreat—the late nineteenth century, the mid twentieth century, and the early 1990s—has hemisphericism flourished. We posit three mechanisms through which intellectual traditions can decline, thus generating a modified cognitivist argument that can supplement power-based and interest-based explanations of regime formation and robustness.

In 1990, Mexico made a daring proposal to the United States: the establishment of a free trade zone between both nations. Historically, this was not the first time that a Latin American nation approached the United States with a request for securing a special bilateral relationship or economic alliance. What was new, however, was that the U.S. accepted. First, President George Bush embraced Mexico’s proposal to negotiate a free trade agreement, and in his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), envisioned expanding free trade throughout the hemisphere. Then, President Bill Clinton completed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and obtained congressional ratification. Clinton went further: in 1994 he invited the democratically elected presidents and heads of governments of the Americas to a summit to discuss ways of deepening hemispheric cooperation. Latin Americans accepted the invitation with one condition: that free trade should be the centerpiece.

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of the Summit agenda. Never before had most Latin American nations been so keen on including hemispheric free trade in discussions of regime formation with the United States and Canada. Initially reluctant, the United States went along.

Both the decision by the U.S. to engage Latin America and Latin America’s insistence that free trade be part of such cooperative efforts constitute the most far-reaching steps by the nations of the hemisphere to build an encompassing regime of cooperation. This effort culminated in the December 1994 Summit of the Americas, where the nations of the hemisphere signed a set of Agreements committing themselves to cooperate toward an impressive array of goals in politics (advancement of democracy, good governance), in economics (free trade in the hemisphere, financial coordination), and in security (the fight against the drug trade, the collective defense of democracy). The Miami Texts also include commitments in “new areas”: the promotion of sustainable development, anticorruption practices, human rights, energy and the environment, women’s issues, etc. (see White House, 1995; Feinberg, 1997:161–84).

What explains these momentous decisions? Why did thirty-four nations of the hemisphere agree to sign the most far-reaching document on intrahemispheric integration in 1994? What explains the rise in the 1990s of what we call “hemispherism”—the active attempt by the nations of the hemisphere to redirect their foreign policies in favor of closer and coordinated cooperation with one another?

To answer this question, we first situate the 1994 Summit in historical context. We show that the 1994 Agreements constitute the farthest that the nations of the hemisphere have ever come in their efforts to build regimes of inter-American cooperation. Interest in such regimes dates back to the late eighteenth century, but it was not until the 1990s that these regimes were possible. We thus ask the question—why the delay?

The 1994 Summit, however, is not the only instance of hemispheric rapprochement. On two previous occasions—in the late nineteenth century and the mid twentieth century—the nations of the hemisphere made regime inroads. While modest in comparison to the 1994 Agreements, these instances marked new heights in inter-American cooperation and rule-formation. Our second question is therefore: What explains these previous regimes of cooperation and why were they modest, or at least, not as far-reaching as the 1994 regime?

This article is thus concerned with questions of regime formation. Under what conditions do nations attempt to establish principles, norms, and rules intended to promote international cooperation? It is also concerned with questions of “regime robustness.” Do regimes have any staying power once they are created? We argue that the major regimes of cooperation in the Americas prior to 1994 were followed by periods of relative decline in robustness. During the early twentieth century and during the Cold War, inter-American relations became noticeably estranged, and at times, hostile. And yet, these declines in robustness were of limited magnitude. Despite the pressures that befell these regimes, inter-American cooperation never

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1 We adhere to Keohane’s (1989:4) lean definition of international regimes: “Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations.”

2 Hemispherism, as we define it, is a type of regionalism. Gamble and Payne (1996:258) define regionalism as state efforts to “deepen the integration of particular regional economic space.” Like others (e.g., Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; ECLAC, 1994), Gamble and Payne rightly point out that regionalism in the Western Hemisphere in the 1990s is better described as “open regionalism” because it did not emerge as an alternative to globalization (as regionalism traditionally tend to be). Although this regionalism is based on regional preferences, and membership is closed to extraregional countries, it is trade-creating and potentially consistent with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-World Trade Organization (WTO) principles. In addition, the Summit texts call for hemispheric cooperation as a step toward globalization. In fact, they go beyond traditional conceptions of open regionalism because they are not exclusively concerned with economic issues; they also tackle political and social concerns. That is one reason we prefer to use a different label for this concept. For a more skeptical view on this see Bhagwati (1997) and Naim (1994).
fell below the level that existed prior to the creation of the regime. In short, the history of regime formation and robustness in inter-American affairs since the nineteenth century can be characterized broadly as repeated instances of many steps forward followed by some steps backward.

We argue that this evolution of regimes of cooperation cannot be explained fully by only one set of theories of regime formation. Hypotheses derived from neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought can account for some moments of this evolution, but not for the entire story. We thus propose supplementing neorealist and neoliberal arguments with an examination of the role of intellectual traditions, which we define as the set of ideas, values, and images that prevail in a given society. We argue that intellectual traditions shape the formation of regimes of cooperation, and to some extent, their robustness. A necessary condition for regime emergence is a favorable intellectual climate. In the Americas, however, the intellectual climate has been mostly unfavorable to hemispherism. Specifically, since the nineteenth century, a set of antihemispheric intellectual traditions has dominated the region, impeding the rise of hemispherism. Inroads toward hemispheric cooperation were possible only when these intellectual traditions lost appeal. Thus, we argue, the greater the decline of this intellectual tradition, the more far-reaching the regime cooperation.

But how do intellectual traditions decline? We suggest three ways: (1) through the rise of competing intellectual traditions; (2) through empirical invalidation; and (3) through what we call institutional “de-embeddedness,” i.e., the process whereby intellectual traditions lose institutional homes at the state, transnational, and societal level. Each of these three processes erodes the political influence of an intellectual tradition. We expect to find more robust and encompassing regimes of cooperation the more these conditions are met.

Regimes of Cooperation in the Americas in the Last 200 Years

Three broad points can be made about the history of regime formation in the Americas since the late eighteenth century. First, a full-fledged regime of cooperation took a long time to form—200 years to be exact. Originally proposed in the late eighteenth century, the idea of greater inter-American cooperation continuously faced formidable obstacles. Second, before the 1990s, there were two moments during which significant cooperative inroads were nonetheless made: 1889–1906 and 1933–1954. Third, each of these hemispheric moments, in turn, was followed by periods of significant—but not total—regime decline.

The Rise and Immediate Decline of the “Western Hemisphere Idea,” Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries

Even before the birth of most American nations, the demand for regimes of inter-American cooperation was already alive. The intellectual underpinning of this demand was what Whitaker (1954) labels the “Western Hemisphere Idea”—the proposition that the peoples of this hemisphere stand in a “special relationship to one another” that sets them apart from the rest of the world. According to this view, the societies of the hemisphere share more than a geographic location; they also share common political values that go beyond a preference for nontyrannical,
Republican institutions free from the vestiges of European feudalism. It also includes the belief that inter-American cooperation and integration makes domestic political institutions healthier and domestic economies more prosperous.

The Western Hemisphere Idea was also predicated on a common security concern—the realization that the world as a whole was not especially hospitable to nontyrannical societies. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1814), the European powers were keen not only on keeping a balance-of-power system (Craig and George, 1990:28–48), but also on conquering or reconquering territories in the Americas—something that seemed quite daunting to the young and feeble nations of the Americas. Even the bigger United States, encircled by European powers, had reasons to be concerned: England was present in the North and the Atlantic, Russia had claims to the Pacific Northwest, Spain dominated the Southwest and the Gulf of Mexico, France dominated the Midwest and Quebec, and England, France, the Netherlands, and Spain controlled the Caribbean (see Bolton, 1933:458). This encirclement explains, to some extent, the No-Transfer Resolution (1811), whereby the United States stipulated that it “cannot without serious inquietude see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power.” It also explains the Monroe Doctrine (1823), whereby President James Monroe declared:

American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . . With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected. . . . The political system of the allied powers [in Europe] is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

With these pronouncements, the U.S. came very close to embracing fully the Western Hemisphere Idea (Atkins, 1995:113).

Likewise, Latin Americans shared similar security concerns, which explains why many proposed formal hemispheric political and economic alliances against Europe. During this period, Latin Americans’ esteem for the U.S. was high. Some even considered the United States a natural ally (de Onís, 1952; Rama, 1975). The Mexican statesman Lucas Alamán argued, for instance, that while nature had made the countries of America neighbors, “the similarity of their political institutions has bound them even more closely together, strengthening in them the dominion of just and liberal principles” (in Whitaker, 1954:2). Those who took note of the Monroe Doctrine (e.g., the government of Argentina) approved of it. The independence leader Simón Bolívar praised it. Brazil and Colombia even suggested instituting the Monroe Doctrine as a hemispheric doctrine. The first hemispheric

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4 The Western Hemisphere Idea was quite revolutionary when it was born in the eighteenth century. Until then, thinkers from both sides of the Atlantic tended to avoid establishing differences between the New World and the Old—the Americas were considered simply an extension of Europe. But in the mid-eighteenth century, some Europeans began to disparage the New World as a “degenerate and monstrous land.” In response, intellectuals from both North and South America began to exalt the uniqueness of the New World, thus giving rise to the Western Hemisphere Idea (e.g., Molina, 1776; Clavigero, 1780–81; Jefferson, 1787; Hamilton and Madison, 1787).

5 Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico proposed to the United States the establishment of formal bilateral alliances (Gil, 1971:62). Chilean Francisco Bilbao even called for a common citizenship, a federal union, and the abolition of custom duties in the Americas. In 1810, the Lima-born, Chile-resident intellectual Don Juan Egaña conceived a “Plan for the General Defense of the Entire America,” calling for hemispheric governments to contribute “arms, money, and men in case of the slightest attack from, or sedition originating in, Europe” (in Balseiro, 1969:41–42).
After their island was not seized by the French-British-Spanish Congress the United States remained neutral during the wars of independence in Latin America, was slow in granting recognition to new nations, rejected alliances with Latin Americans, almost missed the 1826 Congress of Panama, and for the next sixty years, essentially failed to enforce the No-Transfer Resolution and the Monroe Doctrine.\(^7\) Latin Americans, for their part, could never make up their mind whether they wanted inter-American cooperation, and if so, whether it should be based on the principle of culture (Latin-Catholic countries only), language (Spanish-speaking countries only), regional (Andean nations only, Central American nations only), or strategic interest (include a European guarantor, exclude nations with territorial disputes). The few attempts at regime creation (the 1847–48 Lima Congress, the 1856 Santiago Congress, and the 1865 Second Lima Congress) tended to exclude the U.S. and other Latin American nations, were thinly attended, and produced forgettable results. In short, hemispherism went into a coma from the 1820s to the 1880s.

*The First Great Hemispheric Moment, 1889–1906*

Everything changed in the 1880s when U.S. Secretary of State James G. Blaine persuaded his boss, President Cleveland, and more surprisingly, the U.S. Congress, to adopt a resolution authorizing a conference of American states in Washington.\(^8\) After virtually ignoring most of the southern continent for sixty years, the U.S. now exhibited a new interest in “Pan-Americanism.” This time, the renewed U.S. interest came with a broader agenda: enlarging the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. Rather than simply seeking to keep extrahemispheric actors out, the U.S. now wanted to create formal institutions to facilitate common political, economic, and security objectives—the establishment of a hemispheric peacekeeping system, including arbitration for the settlement of disputes, and the development of trade-enhancing rules, including a customs union (see Mecham, 1962). Latin Americans welcomed the U.S. invitation.

Although the results were not far-reaching,\(^9\) the 1889 Pan-American Conference was an historic landmark in inter-American affairs. It not only marked the end to

\(^5\) In defiance of Bolívar, who wanted the Congress to be a forum of Spanish-speaking countries, the presidents of Colombia, Central America, and Mexico invited the United States and Brazil to participate, thereby transforming the Congress into a Pan-American affair.

\(^7\) It is true that some of the most serious violations of the No-Transfer Resolution and the Monroe Doctrine occurred, not coincidentally, at a time when the U.S. was too busy with domestic problems: during the Civil War (e.g., the French-British-Spanish invasion of Mexico; the Spanish reannexation of the Dominican Republic). It is also true that the U.S. lacked the military capacity to challenge the most serious violator—England. However, the U.S. remained remarkably passive even when it had the capacity to do something: e.g., the British invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1833, the French blockade of Buenos Aires in the 1840s, the Spanish attack on Chile in 1866, the Swedish sale of the island of St. Barthelemy to France in 1878. During each of these episodes, the U.S. had military vessels in the area that could have been used as a deterrent, but were not.

\(^8\) This was not easy. Between 1883 and the First Pan-American Congress (1889), more than five bills authorizing such a Congress were turned down (Calcott, 1968). President Cleveland did not even sign the final resolution.

\(^9\) Latin American nations, for instance, were not terribly enthusiastic about hemispheric trade, preferring instead their secure commercial ties with Europe over uncertain New World markets. In addition, territorial disputes (e.g., between Chile and its neighbors) thwarted efforts to create peacekeeping norms.
the long period of estrangement (1820s–1880s) but, more important, constituted a regional precursor to a League-of-Nations-like system of inter-American relations, including a formal organization (with a permanent seat in Washington). In addition, a new norm of inter-American conduct emerged—regardless of the level of political and military discord among members, or of cultural-linguistic differences, mutual consultation would be expected. For the first time, all nations of the hemisphere agreed to put aside territorial, political, and cultural differences to attempt to create international rules of hemispheric governance. However modest, this was the first real hemispheric regime of cooperation.

Reversal (but Not Death) of Hemispherism, 1906–1928

The modest level of hemispherism achieved in the late nineteenth century went into decline between 1906 and 1928. Hemispheric meetings continued to take place, but progress on many issues was scant. Lofty calls for closer cooperation became nothing more than timid peacekeeping agreements (see Mecham, 1962). By the time of the third Pan-American congress (the 1906 Rio de Janeiro meeting), Latin American nations and the United States were adopting increasingly irreconcilable positions (Peck, 1977a:170–71). The Latin Americans ardently defended the principle of nonintervention (the Calvo Doctrine) and the principle of equal treatment to foreigners (the Drago Doctrine), while the United States strongly resisted both, calling instead for steps to construct regimes of mutual security and peace enhancement. As a result of these differences, each Pan-American meeting was more contentious than the previous one.

Latin America’s reaction to World War I is indicative of the decline of regime robustness. Only eight Latin American nations (mostly the small Caribbean nations) followed the U.S. in declaring war against the Central Powers; seven nations remained neutral.10 Moreover, most Latin American nations after the war were far more eager to participate in the League of Nations (in contradiction of U.S. preferences) than in Pan-American congresses. By the 1920s, a Harvard professor of Latin American History who was a guest at one Pan-American meeting wrote that he “received the distinct impression that the Congress was in reality a purely Latin-American gathering, the United States being tolerated because of its bigness and the political and economic power it wielded, but rather as a spectator than as a participant... The American delegation, it may be said, made no effort to exercise any sort of leadership in the deliberations while on the other hand an undercurrent, not of unfriendliness, but of mistrust, was easily perceptible” (Haring, 1929:116–17).

The 1906–1928 period constitutes a retreat—but not the demise—of hemispherism. No Latin American nation sided with the Great Powers during World War I. And while the League of Nations lured the Latin Americans, it never completely decimated the appeal of Pan-Americanism, which, however weakened, survived long after the demise of the League of Nations. Few Latin Americans expressed interest in exiting the inter-American system, whereas many began to exit the League of Nations by the 1930s (Peck, 1977a:183).11 In addition, the norm of consultation was never abandoned, as evidenced by the fact that six international conferences of American states took place between 1889 and 1928. Moreover, progress in rule-making and cooperation during these conferences was modest, but not nonexistent

10 Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama declared war. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela remained neutral. Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay only broke relations with Germany.

11 By the 1930s, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Brazil officially withdrew from the League. Peru and Bolivia ceased to participate in the League between 1921 and 1929; Argentina did not participate until 1933.
A Second Hemispheric Push (1933-1954) Followed by Decline Again (the Cold War Years)

Despite the collapse of world trade during the 1930s, inter-American political and security relations improved steadily after 1933. U.S. and Latin American leaders began to see one another as partners (Good Neighbor Policy, 1933), and talked about continental solidarity based on democratic values against military assault (Declaration of Lima, 1938). During and immediately after World War II, they formulated a common policy against European perils, built a system of collective security (the Rio Treaty, 1947), and created a formal organization to address hemispheric affairs (the Organization of American States, OAS, 1948). In terms of politics and security issues, inter-American cooperation was in full bloom by the 1950s.13

Yet, once again, regime robustness declined thereafter.14 After 1954, hemispheric euphoria gave way to a period of hemispheric mistrust that lasted throughout the rest of the Cold War. Most Latin American nations relaxed their loyalty to the United States, with which some even developed serious political differences. At the United Nations, Latin Americans began to vote against the United States. The United States, in turn, became less inclined to resort to hemispheric institutions for resolving international disputes. As in the early twentieth century, Latin American nations developed preferences for alignment with extrahemispheric actors. For instance, Venezuela was a founding member of OPEC, Brazil deepened its ties with socialist (Luzophone) Africa, Argentina increased trade with the USSR, and a nationalist Peruvian military government made huge purchases of Soviet military equipment. By the 1970s, most Latin Americans reestablished relations with Cuba. The OAS, a pillar of the postwar inter-American system, also failed to live up to its expectations, playing roles in only a few peacekeeping initiatives (Wilson and Dent, 1995). By the mid 1980s, the inter-American system was moribund. Latin American nations did not regard their interests as harmonious with those of the United States (Wesson, 1986). The OAS was mired in dissent and inaction (Scheman, 1988). And as Kurth (1990) argued, the principle of nonintervention became the practice of unilateral intervention, and the principle of collective security became the practice of collective nonintervention. Despite a series of treaties and organizations created to foment hemispheric trade (e.g., the 1960 Treaty of Montevideo, the Latin American Association of Free Trade), U.S.–Latin American trade as a proportion of total U.S. trade declined steadily.

12 The Gondra Treaty stipulated that controversies not settled through diplomatic channels or arbitration under existing treaties would be submitted to a commission of inquiry, and no nation would mobilize or make attacks until six months after the commission made its report. It was ratified by most countries except Chile and Peru (Peck, 1977a:185).
13 There was, however, one “deficit”—economics. Latin Americans refused to embrace the U.S. call for open trade and open economics, and the U.S. refused to extend significant economic aid to Latin America.
14 The 1954 Caracas Declaration constitutes the turning point in hemispheric cooperation. This declaration aligned Latin Americans behind U.S. containment efforts. But to get Latin American support, the United States had to water down the resolution, and yet most Latin American delegates emerged from the Caracas meeting frustrated and feeling that they had granted the U.S. a blank check to resume interventionism (see Burr, 1973:xxv).
But once again, this decline in robustness did not entail a retreat to the low levels of cooperation of the 1906–1933 period. Integration organizations and norms managed to survive (Atkins, 1995:197–229; Montesinos, 1996). The inter-American system remained intact, and in some cases, produced useful initiatives. Work toward the creation of protocols, consultative commissions, technical meetings, etc., never stopped. Two Summits of the Americas took place (1956 in Panama and 1967 in Punta del Este, Uruguay). Only one Latin American nation (Cuba) proudly “exited” the inter-American system. Thus, the inter-American system did not thrive, but it nonetheless displayed some staying power.

_The Third Hemispheric Peak (Late 1980s to Mid 1990s)_

This picture changed dramatically again in the late 1980s. Latin American nations began to adopt increasingly pro-hemispheric policies, including close alignment with the United States. In addition, most began to pursue economic integration with their neighbors and to press the U.S. for free trade. In 1990, President Bush also turned his attention to the hemisphere with his EAI. Even the moribund OAS underwent a revival, playing crucial roles in the defense of democracy in various countries (Corrales, 1993; Kaysen et al., 1994; Farer, 1996).

All of this culminated in the 1994 Summit of the Americas. The Summit “Declaration of Principles” begins as follows:

>The elected Heads of State and Government of the Americas are committed to advance the prosperity, democratic values and institutions, and security of our Hemisphere. . . . Although faced with differing development challenges, the Americas are united in pursuing prosperity through open markets, hemispheric integration, and sustainable development. We are determined to consolidate and advance closer bonds of cooperation and to transform our aspirations into concrete realities. (White House, 1995:63)

The Declaration and Associated Plan of Action list a set of twenty-three agreements, including political and military affairs (as was the case in the 1940s), and more notably, economic affairs (for the first time ever). Latin America moved toward a foreign policy of “institutionalized bandwagoning” (Hurrell, 1995:273). And the U.S., once again, committed itself to act through hemispheric institutions. As a result, the Summit reshaped and expanded the institutional framework of the inter-American system. A new three-leg system emerged. The first leg consists of the regional institutions: the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank, ECLAC. The second leg is the series of ministerial meetings and working groups set in motion by the Miami Summit. The third leg is the growing array of partnerships between public sector agencies and civil society organizations, forged in some instances to implement the Miami texts (Leadership Council, 1998:10). In short, in terms of issue area, rule formation, and institution-building, the 1994 Summit represents the richest level of hemispherism to date.

The power of the new inter-American regime of cooperation becomes clearer when compared to a similar regime of regional coordination—the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN has proven ineffective in dealing with various regional political and economic crises since the late 1980s. In contrast,
the new inter-American system, while far from perfect, has had notable successes. In 1996, inspired by the Summit texts, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, the OAS, and the United States intervened politically in Paraguay to neutralize an ongoing coup. Brazil and Argentina threatened to intervene militarily and expel Paraguay from Mercosur; the United States and the OAS provided daily advice, and even refuge, to the Paraguayan president during the crisis (Aiguadé, 1996:187–94; Valenzuela, 1997). In March 1998, similar pressures dissuaded the Paraguayan president from canceling presidential elections. Likewise, the hemispheric response to recent economic crises has also been quite rule-conforming. Rather than eschew adjustment, as some ASEAN members have done, the nations of the Americas responded to the economic crises of the 1990s for the most part by adhering to “Miami-norms” of economic governance (open economies, stable exchange rates, fiscal equilibrium), and in some cases, deepening the reforms (e.g., in the financial sector). In fact, rule-adherence has extended into other areas. A recent review of progress on key Miami initiatives (democracy/human rights, civil society, corruption, narcotics and money laundering, trade, capital market liberalization, education, health, sustainable development), co-authored by leading hemispheric leaders, concludes that progress has ranged somewhere between “modest” and “good” (Leadership Council, 1998).

Thus, the historical evolution of hemispherism since the late eighteenth century is characterized, first, by a very slow forward progression that has taken almost two centuries to reach its present peak. Second, along the way, there were two moments of significant hemispheric strides (1889–1906, and 1933–1954). In terms of norm-creation, institution-building, and issue areas, each regime was richer than the previous one. This is shown in Table 1. Each of these regimes was followed by periods of decline in robustness (1906–1928, and the Cold War years), but these declines never matched the previous low points.

Explaining Regime Formation and Robustness: Power- and Interest-based Arguments

How would theories of international regimes explain the many-steps-forward-some-steps-backward trajectory of regime formation in the Americas? Following Hasenclever et al. (1997), we can divide the literature on regime formation, one of the most extensive in IR theory, into three clusters: (1) power-based theories (neorealism), (2) interest-based theories (neoliberalism), and (3) knowledge-based theories (cognitivism).16 Although carrying out full tests of each of these sets of theories is beyond the scope of this article, it is nonetheless possible to outline how each school of thought would fare.

Power-based Theories of Regime Formation (Neorealism)

Power-based theories generally posit that the concern for distribution of power in an anarchic world leads nations to focus more on self-help and relative gains than on cooperation (Grieco, 1988, 1993). Nevertheless, power-based theories do not rule out the possibility of cooperation. Neorealists acknowledge that, under certain conditions, regimes will happen. Specifically, most realists agree that international cooperation is contingent on the actions of hegemons. They disagree, however, as

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16 Cognitivists, in turn, are divided between weak and strong cognitivists. Weak cognitivists stress that ideas play a causal role in political outcomes. Strong cognitivists, on the other hand, argue that ideas influence not only actor behavior, but also the understanding of the observer. Whereas weak cognitivists treat ideas as a supplement to rationality-based theories, strong cognitivists reject the whole enterprise of rational, positivist social science (Hasenclever et al., 1997). In this article we examine only weak cognitivism.
to which actions of a hegemon engender or erode cooperation. Regardless of the version adopted, neorealism cannot totally account for the history of hemispherism.

**Balance-of-Power Theories.** One strand of realism argues that the mere rise of a hegemon hurts cooperation because it induces secondary nations to turn to “balancing” (Waltz, 1979). Weak states react to the rise of a disproportionately powerful nation by boosting their military capacity (internal balancing) or seeking allies against the rising power (external balancing). This formulation can account for important moments of hemispherism.17 For instance, in the late nineteenth century, the hemisphere experienced a true “systemic change” in Gilpin’s (1981:42–43) sense: the U.S. emerged as the undisputed hegemon, far outstripping its main rivals in the region. The decline of hemispherism after 1906 has something to do with Latin America’s unease with the disproportionate rise of U.S. power.

There are, however, some problems. This uneasiness does not exactly qualify as balancing, in the Waltzian sense. First, except for Cuba between 1960 and 1989 and, to a lesser extent, Peronist Argentina in the 1940s, Grenada briefly in the early 1980s, and Sandinista Nicaragua in the 1980s, no Latin American country balanced against the U.S. through either internal or external means. Latin American nations did resist U.S. power, but principally through symbolic gestures and economic nationalism that manifest itself through efforts to enhance economic independence.

Second, a balance-of-power argument would have a difficult time explaining the repeated efforts by Latin America to deepen hemispherism, construct institutions, and refuse to let these institutions die even during tense moments of U.S.–Latin American relations. Finally, and perhaps more telling, Waltzian neorealism cannot explain the sharp variations in levels of hemispheric cooperation since the late nineteenth century, given that U.S. hegemony has been a structural constant. Specifically, it cannot explain why U.S.–Latin American cooperation peaked during those very times when U.S. hegemonic standing rose (late nineteenth century, shortly after World War II, and the early 1990s).

**Hegemonic Stability Theory.** Another strand of realism predicts the exact opposite dynamic: the rise of a hegemon actually increases the possibility of international cooperation, for at least two reasons. First, hegemons promote cooperation because they are willing to absorb the costs of cooperation. This “hegemonic stability theory” sees international cooperation as a public good: cooperation requires nations to bear certain costs, but because the benefits of cooperation are neither excludable nor rivalrous, actors face few incentives to absorb such costs. Only all-encompassing actors (Olson, 1982), such as a large hegemon that has the most to gain from this public good, will be willing to pay for such a good (Kindleberger, 1986; see also Keohane, 1980, 1984). Second, hegemons foster cooperation because power

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17 For a recent realist-structuralist account of inter-American affairs see Smith, 1996.
attracts. Small nations might find it in their interest to “bandwagon” with big powers, in part, because resisting is futile, but also because they realize that there are enormous gains to be derived from close association with a powerful nation.

Applied to inter-American affairs, this strand of realism overcomes some of the shortcomings of Waltz’s neorealism. For instance, it helps to explain the rise of hemispherism in the late nineteenth century and shortly after World War II—moments of hemispheric advance that coincide with leaps in U.S. hegemony. In addition, the regimes of the 1940s and 1990s followed comparable changes in structure: a regional crisis (trade depression and debt crisis) followed by a resurgent United States (the end of World War II and Korea, the Cold War). However, a “hegemonic stability” argument cannot explain the decline of cooperation in the early twentieth century and during the Cold War, when the U.S. made enormous efforts to “buy” cooperation (Dollar Diplomacy in the early twentieth century and the 1956 Panama Summit, the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Eximbank to trade with Latin America in the late 1950s, the 1961 Alliance for Progress, the 1967 Punta del Este Summit, and the 1977 Carter-Torrijos Treaties during the Cold War).18

Balance of Threat. Yet another version of realism posits that cooperation depends not on variations in power asymmetry, but on conditions of threat. Walt (1987), for instance, argues that the rise of a powerful hegemon is not a sufficient condition for balancing (as Waltz maintains) and that the rise of a cost-absorbing hegemon is not a sufficient condition for cooperation (as Kindleberger argues). Instead, bandwagoning is contingent on low levels of hegemonic threat. Recently, Schweller and Priess restated this argument: “If the hegemon adopts a benevolent strategy and creates a negotiated order based on legitimate influence and management, lesser states will bandwagon with, rather than balance against it” (1997:24).

To test this argument we need clear indicators of “benevolent” or “legitimate” actions, which are difficult to develop. However, theorists in this tradition would probably accept that an indicator of nonbenevolence is active militarism on the part of the hegemon. Does inter-American cooperation decline according to increases in U.S. militarism in the region? Sometimes the answer is yes, as in the 1906–1933 period. By 1906, the U.S. became a military bully, fighting Spain (the 1898 Spanish-American War), the British (the 1902 Venezuelan crisis), and Colombia (the 1903 Panama revolution). The U.S. also applied militarily the Roosevelt Corollary in the Dominican Republic (1905), and established protectorates in Cuba, Puerto

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18 At the 1956 Panama Summit, the United States sought to revive hemispheric allegiance to U.S. containment efforts. However, the Summit produced only a vague statement of support, prompting the New York Times to describe the event as a mere “informal parley.” The 1961 Alliance for Progress was a more serious effort at integration. Like the 1994 Miami Summit texts, the Charter of the Alliance called for greater international cooperation, deep domestic structural reforms, sustained economic development, more equitable economic distribution, and better public services. If anything, U.S. commitment to the hemisphere was higher during the Alliance than during the Miami Process, at least in terms of foreign assistance: the U.S. allocated $20 billion to the Alliance. But by the mid 1960s, U.S.–Latin American relations were back in disarray. For the 1967 Summit, Latin Americans (Argentine president Arturo Illa and Chilean president Eduardo Frei) took the initiative and proposed a more substantive agenda than in 1956, including the possibility of greater trade integration. Some crucial agreements were reached, mostly on scientific, technological, and technical issues. Also, the signatories adopted the Generalized System of Preferences (whereby industrial groups gain temporary tariff advantages to developing countries), which was later adopted by the world trading system. Nevertheless the central objectives of the 1967 Summit were not achieved. The proposed Latin American Common Market failed to prosper, the Alliance for Progress did not revive, and hemispheric loyalty toward the United States continued to decline thereafter (Gordon, 1967; Tulchin, 1994). The 1977 Carter-Torrijos Treaty transferring the Canal Zone to Panama was also supposed to bring the hemisphere together, but it too turned out to be a disappointment. The U.S. public failed to understand President Carter’s concessions, while Latin Americans refused to relinquish their penchant for an independent foreign policy. Few Latin American nations, for instance, went along with the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. Even Torrijos refused to cut off arms shipments to the Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua, as Carter had begged him to do in 1979 (see, e.g., Pastor, 1992; Hogan, 1986; Moffett, 1985).
Rico, Panama, and throughout the Pacific—a clear rise in hegemonic threat which might explain why the third Pan-American Congress (1906 Rio de Janeiro) was so contentious. U.S. interventionism thereafter—seven military interventions in six northern Latin American countries between 1906 and 1928 (Kryzanek, 1995)—also coincides with regime decline between 1906 and 1928. Inversely, the transformation of the U.S. into a noninterventionist hegemon in the 1930s (the Good Neighbor Policy) and in the years immediately after World War II also coincides with rising hemispherism.

And yet, the balance-of-threat argument would fail to explain why hemispherism does not disintegrate during periods of rising militarism. If Walt’s theory were entirely correct, hemispherism should have reached its lowest point in the early twentieth century, the peak years of U.S. militarism in the region. But, as argued, the regime retained some robustness. Finally, Walt would probably have a hard time explaining the rise of hemispherism in the 1990s, which came on the heels of renewed U.S. military activism in the region (the 1989 unilateral invasion of Panama, the 1994 United Nations–accredited invasion of Haiti, the increased military spending to fight the drug trade).

A final reformulation of the balance-of-threat theory would sustain that inter-American cooperation rose in response to the security threats posed by nonhemispheric actors. The argument would be that the U.S. and Latin American nations are more likely to cooperate with one another in the presence of external threats. This perspective might help to explain the rise of hemispherism during and after World War II, when many Latin American nations regarded, first, the Axis power, and then, the Soviet bloc, as real threats. It might also explain hemispheric unity during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which was the most blatant Soviet incursion in the Americas. Nevertheless, the extrahemispheric-threat hypothesis is not flawless. It cannot explain why late in the 1960s, despite Cuba’s renewed commitment to the USSR and armed struggle, Latin American nations began to normalize relations with Cuba and the USSR, at the cost of upsetting the U.S. More important, the theory cannot explain the collapse of hemispherism in the 1820–1880 period, when the Great Powers of Europe posed grave threats to the Americas. In short, the hypothesis that lesser states balance as a result of hegemonic threats also falls short of providing a full explanation for variations in hemispherism.

**Interest-based Theories**

One of the strongest criticisms of neorealism is that it downplays the extent to which economic interdependence raises the demand for international cooperation, a criticism that dates back to Immanuel Kant but which Keohane and Nye (1977) popularized in recent times. Baldwin (1980:484) defines interdependence succinctly as “relationships that would be costly to break.” The general argument is that under strong interdependence nations develop an interest in cooperative initiatives. Regimes of cooperation emerge to resolve collective action problems, coordination problems, and transaction costs that stand in the way of such interests (Keohane, 1984). Can these arguments explain the evolution of hemispherism?

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19 On October 23, 1962, in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the OAS unanimously called all members to take whatever actions necessary to ensure the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Venezuela and Argentina sent warships to Cuban waters. In the next few years, as Cuba’s involvement in revolutionary movements in Latin America increased, the Rio Treaty imposed trade sanctions on Cuba; only Mexico refused to break relations with Cuba (Domínguez, 1989:26–29).
**Interdependence.** One simple and common indicator of interdependence is levels of trade.\(^{20}\) Figure 1 plots U.S. imports from and exports to Latin America as a proportion of total U.S. trade. Several observations can be made. First, U.S. interdependence with the Americas has varied significantly (unlike power structures, which varied little), but it has never been very high. In the last 200 years, exports to Latin America seldom reached 25 percent of total U.S. trade (imports, however, have been considerably more important). At one level, this explains why hemispherism has had such an arduous history—the U.S. has not had a strong economics-based interest in close cooperation with its neighbors. Second, there are two moments during which there is some correlation between share of exports (one indicator of interdependence) and hemispherism: between 1933 and 1960, exports to Latin America expanded, reaching almost 30 percent during several of these years. In addition, the fact that the share of exports declined throughout most of the nineteenth century and the Cold War period correlates with the stagnation of hemispherism during these years.

However, the interdependence hypothesis is disconfirmed by other aspects of the data. For instance, it cannot explain the emergence of hemispherism in the 1880s, a time of historically low levels of exports. It cannot explain the decline of hemispherism in the early twentieth century, when export levels increased, and the rise of hemispherism starting in the 1930s, when exports declined.\(^{21}\) More important, it has a difficult time explaining the hemispheric peak of the 1990s. Although exports increased in the 1990s, they hardly reached a historical peak. Exports during this period barely reached 20 percent, and imports reached an all-time low. In fact, export levels between 1985–1994 and 1965–1985 differ only marginally, and yet the differences in degrees of hemispherism are substantial. Even where there seems to be a strong correlation between economic interdependence and regime formation (1940s and 1950s), a question arises: Why is economic integration the “missing” issue in the regime of cooperation that emerged during this period?

Historical data on Latin America’s level of interdependence on the U.S. is difficult to assemble. However, data from recent years is available, and this, too, shows that Latin America’s recent turn toward hemispherism cannot be explained easily by changes in the structure of trade links. Table 2 shows the structure of trade for the nine largest Latin American countries, broken down by destination trading regions—Asia, Europe, the U.S., and Latin America. Was the turn toward hemispherism a result of changes in levels of trade with the U.S.? The answer is, hardly. First, the U.S. was the number one destination region of only three countries (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela). Second, Table 3 shows that, while most countries increased their level of trade with the United States between 1986 and 1994, the change was for the most part very modest (with the exception of Argentina). Thus, hemispherism in the 1990s cannot be easily explained as the result of growing trade interdependence with the U.S.

Was the turn toward hemispherism a result of a fear of being left out from prevailing trade blocs, what Fawcett (1995) calls “fear of economic marginalization”? The realization that European markets would be closed was an important motive in Mexico’s decision to negotiate a free trade with the U.S. and Canada. But can the argument be extended to the rest of the hemisphere? On the one hand, Table 3

\(^{20}\) In a review of the literature on interdependence and conflict, McMillan (1997:53) finds that there is significant variation in the way trade is operationalized (e.g., trade volume, trade values, systemic trade levels) and that this might have an impact on the different findings. For the sake of simplicity, we use percentage of world trade as a measure of interdependence.

\(^{21}\) Between 1928 and 1938, the trade ratio (the sum of exports and imports divided by the gross domestic product) of almost all Latin American nations declined significantly, in some cases by more than 50 percent (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
Fig. 1. U.S. trade with Latin America as a percentage of total trade
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shows that the percentage of Latin American trade with Europe declined during this period, in some cases quite dramatically (Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela), suggesting a European closure. On the other hand, there is little evidence of an Asian closure: a significant number of Latin American nations increased their levels of trade with Asia, in some cases quite dramatically (Colombia, Peru). And except
for Brazil, those nations that experienced a decline in trade with Asia did so modestly. The most notable change in the structure of Latin American trade is the expansion of intra-Latin American trade. Latin American exports to other Latin American nations increased in value over 135 percent between 1986 and 1992 (Naim, 1994:54). Thus, it is not easy to state that the turn to hemispherism on the part of Latin America is the result of closed doors.

The closure factor, however, might have played a bigger role at the level of expectations. In the 1980s, the United States became fearful of being discriminated against by European and Asian blocs, and had reasons to fear that the Uruguay Round of trade talks might collapse. These concerns prompted the U.S. to support regional (as opposed to multilateral) trade negotiations, as both an insurance policy in case Europe and Asia closed themselves further and as pressure mechanisms to get other nations to take the Uruguay talks more seriously (Wyatt-Walter, 1995:84-88). Likewise, Latin Americans in the 1990s did regard the U.S. as the most attractive market, but also the most prone to closure (either through U.S. exclusive attention to NAFTA or through the rise of protectionism). Given the Latin American gamble of jettisoning protectionism in favor of an export-oriented model in the 1990s, a closure of the U.S. (or NAFTA) markets would have been a devastating blow, which might explain why Latin Americans were keen on locking U.S. interest in the entire region.

However, this expectation-of-closure argument cannot explain the 1994 U.S. decision to proceed with free trade in the Americas. This decision was made after the U.S. secured access to important trading clusters: NAFTA, ASEAN, and after the successful completion of the Uruguay Round. In addition, this explanation overstates the role of economics in Latin America's recent interest in hemispherism. It cannot explain why Latin Americans were also interested in other political, security, and social issues.
In sum, trade appears to be a significant variable in explaining hemispherism in the 1940s and 1950s and in explaining low hemispherism in the nineteenth century. However, changes in trade patterns seemed to have played lesser roles in the two other periods of regime formation—the late nineteenth century and the 1990s. Therefore, trade alone offers an incomplete explanation for hemispherism (see also Hurrell, 1995:272). The levels of hemispheric trade dependence have not varied sufficiently—or in the hypothesized direction—to account for the variation of regime formation and robustness in the Americas.

**Functional Institutionalism.** A different version of interest-based theories is what Keohane (1990) has denominated “sophisticated liberalism” (as opposed to republican, commercial, and regulatory liberalism). Accordingly, cooperation flourishes insofar as there are accompanying rules that assist nations in coordinating their behavior, resolving collective action problems, and avoiding suboptimal outcomes.\(^{22}\) Regimes thus emerge to fulfill specific functions. They reduce uncertainty and transaction costs (Keohane, 1984). And once these regimes emerge, nations develop an interest in maintaining them even when the factors that brought them into being are no longer operative.

There is no doubt that the regimes of cooperation in the Americas had a functionalist origin. At each Pan-American gathering, actors had concrete goals they wanted to pursue and problems to resolve. They deliberately discussed specific norms and institutional mechanisms to achieve such objectives. Moreover, Keohane’s argument about the stickiness of regimes helps to explain the survival of hemispherism during periods of duress (e.g., 1906–1933 and 1954–1980s). The main problem is that this argument, as many critics of this tradition have made abundantly clear, cannot explain the supply of regimes as well as it can explain the demand. Why has the supply of institutions of cooperation fallen short of expectations, especially in the nineteenth century? Why, despite these shortages, do we observe different levels of regime formation in the last 100 years? Why was the 1889–1906 regime more modest than subsequent ones? Finally, functional institutionalism cannot explain why similarly rich and sophisticated inter-American institutions created in the 1940s produced such different degrees of cooperation (close cooperation between 1945 and 1954, estrangement between 1954 and the late 1980s).

**Idea-based Arguments**

A third set of theories explains regime formation as the result of ideas and knowledge acquired by actors. Actors hold beliefs, which are often independent of objective material and environmental conditions. Actors maximize utility, but perceptions of utility depend on prevailing ideas and knowledge. By acting as “road maps” or “focal points,” ideas influence the extent to which actors are willing to pursue international cooperation (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Ideas tend to have greater political impact the more they become embedded in institutions (Hall, 1989; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Domínguez, 1997) or come to be shared by key policymakers through “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1992).

To what extent have intellectual traditions shaped trends in inter-American cooperation? We argue—significantly, but often as impediments. Ever since the late nineteenth century, ideas that discount the benefit of cooperation have circulated widely throughout the Western Hemisphere, constantly impeding the rise of

\(^{22}\) For a recent argument that cooperation in the Americas has been hurt as a result of “inadequate organizational forms” and “weak institutional arrangements” see Montesinos, 1996.
hemispherism. However, as is the case with the other two schools of thought, a single-minded focus on ideas is also insufficient to account for the variation of hemispherism.

**Intellectual Traditions That Hindered Hemispherism**

Most arguments about the role of ideas in regime formation are predicated on the notion of convergence. That is, regimes form when actors and institutions adopt convergent ideas about goals and solutions. But in inter-American affairs, the most important obstacle to the rise of hemispheric regimes has not been the lack of convergence. Moments of enormous convergence on ideas did not result in strong regimes of cooperation. Instead, a decisive obstacle has been an oversupply of “antihemispheric” intellectual traditions.

*The No-Benefit Doctrine in the U.S.* In the United States, a constant antihemispheric intellectual tradition has been what we label “the No-benefit doctrine”—the idea that the United States has nothing to gain, and probably a lot to lose, from ties with the nations of the hemisphere. The No-benefit doctrine erupted in the late 1810s during the debates concerning the appropriate U.S. foreign policy toward the wars of independence in Latin America. A leading advocate of hemispherism, Rep. Henry Clay, strongly condemned the administration for its hesitation to recognize and support the independence of the new American nations. In his private diaries, President John Quincy Adams (then Secretary of State) explained the reasons for this hesitation:

> So far as [Latin Americans] were contending for independence, I wished well to their cause; but I had seen and yet see no prospect that they would establish free or liberal institutions of government. They are not likely to promote the spirit either of freedom or order by their example. They have not the first elements of good or free government. Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon all their institutions. . . . I had little expectation of any beneficial result to this country from any future connection with them, political or commercial. We should derive no improvement to our own institutions by any communion with theirs. (in Karnes, 1972:17)

This No-benefit doctrine differed from isolationism, the then-official foreign policy of the United States, because it was specifically discriminating. Whereas isolationism made no distinctions across countries (ties with any nation were to be avoided), the No-benefit doctrine singles out Latin American republics as particularly objectionable partners because they are prone to bad governments.

The No-benefit doctrine essentially killed any enthusiasm in the U.S. for hemispherism in the nineteenth century. It helps explain why the United States remained neutral during the wars of independence in South America and was slow in granting recognition to the new republics, and why the Monroe Doctrine was stipulated in such noncommittal terms. It helps to explain why the U.S. failed to participate in the first hemispheric congress—the Congress of Panama. President John Quincy Adams wanted to send delegates, but Congress resisted. Congressman Robert Y. Haynes (S.C.) argued: “No man can deny that the Congress of Panama is to be composed of deputies from belligerent states, and that its objects are essentially belligerent” (in Karnes, 1972:49). To get approval, Adams had to assure Congress that the United States would remain free of any commitments. In the end, Congress
authorized the mission, but the delay prevented the U.S. delegate from arriving in time. No other hemispheric congress took place until 1889.

In the early part of this century, Latin America’s growing instability, especially in the Caribbean, fueled the No-benefit doctrine in the U.S. This instability corroborated the U.S. view of Latin America as a land of vulnerabilities and thus opportunities for Europeans to make comebacks into the Americas (often to collect debts). Consequently, the U.S. adopted a policy of sovereignty-denial in northern Latin America—since these nations, as sovereign republics, provided more headaches than benefits, the U.S. should rationally move to wipe out their sovereignty.

During the Cold War, the antihemispheric sentiment in the United States was refueled by the rise of North-Atlanticism—a preference for strong relations with Europe. This new orientation challenged the Western Hemisphere premise that the United States had a “special relation” with the Americas. Furthermore, the No-benefit doctrine became a favorite of Cold War hawks, who saw Latin America as an area of little geopolitical importance compared to Eurasia. The region had to be safe from the Soviets, but (except for the Caribbean) it lacked sufficient strategic value to play a major role in the East-West struggle. In the 1950s, for instance, Latin America was the last of the major world areas to receive Ford Foundation funding for area studies (Skidmore, 1998:107). And the intensification of illiberal politics in Latin America after the 1950s further reaffirmed negative images of the region (see, e.g., Packenham, 1973).

**Antihemispheric Intellectual Traditions in Latin America.** The Western Hemisphere Idea also had potent opponents in Latin America. Unlike the United States, which was born with a consensus on foreign policy, Latin American nations were born severely torn over a number of foreign policy doctrines in addition to the Western Hemisphere Idea: Bolivarism, Latin-Americanism, Europeanism, Internalism, Land-deprivationism, and later on, Yankeephobia. Every one of these directly challenged the Western Hemisphere Idea.

Bolivarism, the main thesis of Latin America’s liberator Simón Bolívar, is the call for unity of Spanish America under a European tutor. Bolívar argued that Latin American unity—maybe even merger—was necessary to preserve the region’s independence. But this union must exclude Brazil and the United States. Brazil was to be excluded because of its non-Spanish heritage and non-Republican regime; the United States because of its non-Spanish heritage and most important, its general military unreliability. A more effective and committed protector, Bolívar argued, was England.

Latin Americanism is the idea that the Americas are fundamentally divided into separate ethnic-cultural groups: those of Latin descent (including Spanish, Portuguese, and French) and the Anglo-Saxon. Rather than natural allies, the Anglo-Saxons and the rest of the hemisphere are incompatible civilizations. Whereas hemispherism calls for integrating the Americas on the basis of common values and goals, Latin-Americanism would separate the Latins and the Anglos on the basis of ethnicity.

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23 Cold War hawks tended to neglect Latin America for at least two reasons. One was balance-of-power assessments: the feeling that U.S. hegemony in the region was secure, or at least more so than elsewhere, and the assumption that the Soviet Union respected this arrangement. The other was a derivation of the No-benefit doctrine: losing Latin America was not as “costly” as losing other strategically more important regions.

24 Various Bolivarian-type congresses took place in the nineteenth century: the Lima Congress (1847–1848) attended by Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada, and Peru; the Santiago Congress (1856) attended by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru; and the Second Lima Congress (1864–1865) attended by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

25 Latin-Americanism differs from Bolivarism in that it calls for unity among all nations of Latin America, including Brazil, and rejects the inclusion of Great Britain.
Europeanism is the idea that bilateral ties with European powers are preferable to closer ties across the hemisphere. After independence, many Latin American elites wanted, more than anything, to be accepted in the international (European) community of nations (Davis, 1977). Since then, the fixation on securing Europe’s blessing has been a recurrent intellectual tradition in Latin America. In the nineteenth century, it made Latin Americans avoid decisions that might upset the Europeans, such as pursuing intrahemispheric alliances, and instead prefer formal alliances with European powers as a better defense against neighbors or domestic enemies, or as a means of fulfilling “manifest destiny.”

Internalism is the idea that domestic state-building takes precedence over international activism. As in the United States, internalism has been appealing to Latin America since the early nineteenth century, but for slightly different reasons. Latin American isolationists rejected hemispherism not because it eroded sovereignty, but rather because it posed a distraction from the nation’s most urgent tasks: domestic unification and pacification in the nineteenth century, development and counter-insurgency in the twentieth century.

Land-Deprivationism is the idea that the nation has been a victim of territorial usurpation. Most Latin American nations were born with uncertain borders. In a region that gave rise to twenty-two nations out of only four major territorial colonial clusters (viceroyals), it is not surprising that feelings of land deprivation proliferated. The uncertainty of territorial settlements, and the violence produced by secessionist trends of the early nineteenth century, instilled mistrust among Latin American nations. This, in turn, gave rise to a preference for a quarrel-thy-neighbor foreign policy in many nations—yet another antihemispheric intellectual tradition.

Yankeephobia emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as a most powerful antihemispheric intellectual tradition. Except in Mexico, this Yankeephobia was initially not a reaction against the military and economic power of the United States (for Latin Americans, the Europeans, not the U.S., were the real powers). Instead, it was first the result of a conservative, Latin-Catholic, cultural rejection of Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, liberal values. Second, nineteenth-century Yankeephobia was also a resentment against the cautious neutrality of the United States, which consistently refused to implement the Monroe Doctrine during most Euro-American conflicts, or to take sides with any American country involved in a territorial dispute. In many ways, this was a Bolivarian type of anti-Americanism, a feeling that the United States was unreliable. Many Latin Americans interpreted

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26 The Europeanists were themselves highly divided over which European power to seek ties with: England, France, Spain, or Germany (at least until World War II).
27 Mexico lost Texas and Central America; Central America, in turn, broke up into five republics; New Granada broke up into Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador; and La Plata broke up into Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia.
28 This reveals how complicated the relationship between Latin-Americanism and hemispherism is: although Latin-Americanism poses a challenge to hemispherism, some degree of Latin-Americanism (i.e., a feeling of “sisterhood” among Latin nations) is also a precondition of hemispherism because it counteracts the very antihemispheric, quarrel-thy-neighbor intellectual traditions.
29 The Uruguayan philosopher José Enrique Rodó ([1900] 1988), to this day obligatory reading in most Latin American high schools, epitomizes this intellectual tradition. Rodó urged his fellow Latin Americans to resist the U.S. because it was a half-educated, spiritually deficient, and culturally mediocre nation and to reinforce instead their Latinism-Hellenism. In the Portuguese-speaking world, another influential Yankeephobe was the Brazilian monarchist Eduardo Prado. His book The American Delusion (1893), which indict Pan-Americanism and all the republics of the Americas—whether Latin or Anglo—for setting the example for the establishment of the new Brazilian republic, sold out a few hours after its publication (in Haring, 1929).
30 Argentina, for instance, resented the United States for refusing to take its side during its conflicts with Brazil and during the British occupation of the Falklands in the 1830s. In the 1860s, the United States failed to deter the Spanish military incursions against Valparaiso (Chile) and the Chincha Islands (Peru). Cuban insurgents were frustrated by U.S. refusal to help in the 1868–1878 war against Spain.
this as a sign that the United States cared little about the region, or at least their own country. Third, Yankeephobia had a peer-rivalry dimension. Sectors of some Latin American nations (e.g., in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina) saw the United States as a competitor for hegemony in the region and thus an obstacle to their own manifest destiny (see Peck, 1977b). Thus, in the nineteenth century, Yankeephobia was not based on a victimizing-victim view of U.S.—Latin American relations.

Latin America’s antihemispheric intellectual traditions also increased in the early twentieth century because Yankeephobia experienced a major boost and transformation. It was then that Yankeephobia finally adopted a classic “balance-of-power” dimension. Latin Americans began to fear that “the big fish would eat the little ones,” as the Peruvian politician Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (1984) succinctly stated it. In turn, this new Yankeephobia was fueled by the arrival in Latin America of socialist ideas circa the 1910s (see Hale, 1986). Socialism changed the ways many Latin Americans looked at intrahemispheric relations. Rather than harmony of interests, U.S.—Latin American relations were now seen through the prism of class conflict and exploitation, encouraging an image of the U.S. as the embodiment of everything inimical to the region’s progress. In sum, a new and more powerful type of Yankeephobia emerged in the early twentieth century that was a composite of the old conservative repudiation of U.S. culture and newer concerns about power asymmetries.

One consequence of this new Yankeephobia was the emergence in Latin America of a preference for absolute principles of nonintervention. This preference proved devastating for hemispherism because it ruled out collective actions on behalf of basic tenets of the Western Hemisphere Idea (democracy, free trade, collective security, etc.). From now on, U.S. efforts to keep extrahemispheric countries out of the region—which Latin Americans would have applauded in the nineteenth century—became objectionable. A no-win view toward U.S. policy spread throughout the hemisphere; U.S. engagement was condemned as imperialistic; U.S. inaction as indifference.31

While the United States began to see the world in terms of the East-West conflict after World War II, Latin American nations began to see it in terms of the North-South divide (a type of Universalism minus the industrialized West). Rather than bettering the South, contacts with the North produce “structural dependency,” and hence, chronic underdevelopment. This took Yankeephobia to new heights. Whereas Haya de la Torre in the 1920s spoke of the “big fish” eating the “small fish,” Juan José Arévalo in the 1960s spoke of “the shark victimizing the sardine” (1961:13). Arévalo argued, “International treaties are a farce when they are pacted between a shark and a sardine,” and dismissed Pan-Americanism as nothing more than an “instrument at the service of the shark.” Latin Americans lost respect for U.S. foreign policy, seeing containment as irrelevant to their concerns and a diversion of resources (Wesson and Muñoz, 1986; Biles, 1988). Energized by the Cuban Revolution, Latin American historians wrote “patriotic histories” and “Marxist megahistories” (Skidmore, 1998:119). Calls were made for “self-reliance,” i.e., diminishing as much as possible the ties with the West in order to regain control over one’s own resources (Galtung, 1981). Inward-oriented models of economic

31 The 1926 Pan-American Congress, celebrating the centennial of the Congress of Panama, exemplified the rise of antihemispheric intellectual traditions in the early twentieth century. Although a proposal was drafted to fortify hemispheric organizations, the United States and most large Latin American nations rejected it (isolationism/no-benefit tradition). The Mexican delegation proposed that the Spanish monarch Alfonso XIII be elected president of the Congress, and the motion to include the sovereigns of Great Britain and the Netherlands passed amid great applause (Bolivarism, Europeanism, Universalism). At the opening ceremony, the most applauded speech came from the Honduran delegate, who argued that the Congress represented an opportunity to “test” the fraternal sentiments of the “colossus of the North” (New and Old Yankeephobia).
development spread throughout the region (see Corbo, 1992; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994). Many Latin Americans also developed an acute case of aid addiction, a derivative of the very North-South notion that poor countries are entitled to never-ending compensation for past wrongs and entrenched inequalities. Insofar as Latin Americans had an interest in trade, they wanted subsidized rather than free trade (see ECLAC, 1994). Thus, while economic liberalism gained prestige in the U.S. (Goldstein, 1993), it virtually disappeared from the largest countries of Latin America. As a result, the idea that trade was advantageous for all—one of the least controversial points in Western Hemisphere thinking since the 1850s—became one of the most divisive issues in U.S.—Latin American relations after the 1940s, which explains the absence of an economic dimension in the postwar regime of cooperation.

Latin Americans also changed their view of sovereignty—no longer defined as merely the preservation of independence (as was the case in the nineteenth century), but now as the capacity to exhibit a “nonaligned” foreign policy. Latin Americans thus rushed to deepen ties with nations outside the hemisphere, democratic or not. The U.S., in turn, changed its view of self-determination—now defined as staying free of communism. The need to prevent a second Cuba superseded the need to defend democracy. As Kennedy declared in his analysis of the 1961 crisis in the Dominican Republic: “There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can’t renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third” (in Packenham, 1973:165). The result was a generalized decline in hemispheric interest in defending democratic values, with every nation of the hemisphere solidifying relations with authoritarian regimes.

Yankeeophobia acquired not only extra fuel, but also extra institutional homes—state bureaucracies and political parties. In the early twentieth century, Yankeeophobic nationalism was prevalent mostly among intellectuals; during the Cold War, however, the Latin American state became “the chief propagandist for nationalism” (Johnson, 1986:94). Not just foreign ministries, but also education ministries and military institutions became filled with nationalists. In addition, most Latin American political parties—left or right—adopted some type of Yankeeophobia. Competing for the nationalist label, no party wanted to be seen as advocating too close ties with the United States. Institutional entrenchment not only solidified the staying power of ideas, but also expanded their reach across society. Given the dramatic expansion of state institutions and the proliferation of party activity in Latin America after World War II, antihemispheric intellectual traditions began to reach a growing number of nonelite sectors: students, soldiers, and party members.

It should be stressed, however, that pro-hemispheric modes of thinking continued to circulate during the Cold War. In Latin America, for instance, conservative forces often toned down their old Yankeeophobia because they, too, shared the U.S. interest in containment. Moreover, not all Latin American leftists were Yankeeophobes: some anticommunist, social-democratic parties emerged (e.g., in Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Puerto Rico), which were eager to fight “both the oligarchs and communists” and still be friends of the United States (Schlesinger, 1975). In the United States, hemisphericism was sustained by “developmentalism”—the idea that U.S. funding of economic development translates into more moderate, stable, and consensual political outcomes—and by a minority of Cold War hawks who considered Latin America a crucial battleground in the fight against communism.\footnote{In 1965 Richard Nixon, for instance, emphasized the need to pay attention to Latin America and other developing regions: “Communism is on the move. . . . Where in the world today do we expect trouble? In the communist satellites}
However, most of the pro-hemispheric intellectual traditions circulating during the Cold War were predicated, paradoxically, on notions that directly contradicted basic tenets of hemispherism. In Latin America, for instance, actors in favor of hemispherism valued it not for itself but simply as a means to other, more opportunistic ends: conservatives wanted U.S. blessing for their authoritarian designs; leftists wanted more room for maneuvering and greater foreign aid.

In the United States, both developmentalists and pro-hemispheric Cold Warriors justified increasing ties based on negative images and preemptive intentions. A stunning example of this was a long memorandum in 1950 by then-counselor of the State Department George F. Kennan to the Secretary of State. From its geography to its social customs, Latin America is described as a source of “problems” for the United States: “It seems to me unlikely that there could be any other region of the earth in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life than in Latin America.” Because of its fragile social fabric, Latin America is vulnerable to communist penetration. In the event of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Kennan concluded, Latin American nations cannot be counted on to become U.S. allies (as they did during World War II) since they would succumb to civil war or communist takeover (U.S. Dept. of State, 1976:598–624). In short, Kennan adapts Adams’s No-benefit doctrine to the Cold War. Given that Latin societies are not culturally inclined toward democracy, why bother with promoting democracy?

Interestingly, both developmentalists and Cold War hawks came to accept this permissive attitude toward noncommunist authoritarianism. For developmentalists, authoritarianism was a passing phase; for Cold Warriors, it was preferable to the alternatives. Engagement was necessary not because Latin Americans were seen as reliable partners, but quite the opposite, because they were seen as unreliable, trouble-prone, illiberal, and vulnerable.

Thus, for nearly 200 years, antihemispheric intellectual traditions overshadowed the Western Hemisphere Idea. In the nineteenth century, there routinely emerged a nation or an intellectual leader ready to question the motives of any hemispheric initiative or resent the inclusion or exclusion of the United States, Brazil, a neighbor, or any European power. In the twentieth century, not even the vigorous intentions of a hegemon or other strong Latin American nations were able to defeat these intellectual traditions.

Revising Idea-based Arguments: The Concept of Idea-Decline

The previous argument, like most idea-based approaches, is not immune to criticism. Weber (1997), for instance, criticizes idea-based arguments, or what he calls “reflectivist approaches,” because they fail to explain change, i.e., variation in structures and regimes over time (p. 247). In addition, he argues that these arguments are “no more precise (and possibly less so) than the rationalist view in explaining the selection of one among many possible institutions,” e.g., voting rules, variety of definitions of property rights, variety of conceptions of sovereignty (pp. 240–41). That is, a reflectivist approach cannot offer a theory of selection (p. 257). To some extent, we agree. As presented so far, antihemispheric intellectual traditions cannot explain the variation in regime formation prior to 1994—the many-steps-forward-some-steps-backward evolution of hemispherism.

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This disregard for democracy is the essence of the 1964 Mann Doctrine, whereby the United States declared that it would tolerate any regime as long as it met two (easy) criteria: oppose communism and welcome U.S. corporations.
If antihemispheric intellectual traditions were pervasive all along, what then accounts for these ups and downs?

Nevertheless, an idea-based approach is not that easy to dismiss. While they might not offer a theory of selection, intellectual traditions do offer a theory of rejection—they explain why regimes based on hemispheric integration were rejected more often than not. Moreover, our idea-based argument can be modified to explain variations in regime formation. We have argued that historically there has always been a demand (based on security, interests, and ideas) for regimes of hemispheric cooperation, but that this demand was repeatedly hampered by more powerful antihemispheric intellectual traditions. It follows, therefore, that a necessary condition for hemisphericism is some decline in antihemispheric intellectual traditions. But, under what conditions do intellectual traditions lose appeal? We suggest three ways.

First, an intellectual tradition can lose appeal if rival intellectual traditions gain prestige. The rise of a rival intellectual tradition serves as a counterweight against the prevailing paradigm. Second, an intellectual tradition can lose appeal if it fails to pass empirical tests. When a series of historical events disconfirm or challenge some of the central tenets of an intellectual tradition, its appeal erodes. Finally, and most important, an intellectual tradition can lose appeal if it undergoes a process of institutional de-embeddedness, i.e., if it is debunked from the political institutions that are homes to these intellectual traditions. Given that institutionalization magnifies the power of ideas (Hall, 1989), it follows then that de-embeddedness should produce the opposite result.

These three processes—rise of rivals, empirical invalidation, and de-embeddedness—undermine the power of intellectual traditions. Independently, each of these processes is insufficient to corrode antihemispheric intellectual traditions, but in combination, they create the space for the emergence of regimes. The more these processes are present, the deeper and richer the regimes of cooperation ought to be. We believe that this argument can explain much of the evolution of hemispherialism.

**Idea-Decline Through the Rise of Rival Intellectual Traditions: The Late 1800s**

The 1889–1906 period exemplifies the results of idea-decline through the rise of rival intellectual traditions. In the late nineteenth century, one of the most serious rivals to antihemispheric intellectual traditions made enormous strides in Latin America—political liberalism. Latin American liberals admired U.S. republican institutions and believed in open economics. Although Latin American liberals had fewer successes in politics than in economics, the late nineteenth century was nonetheless a period of liberal ascendancy. Consequently, the long-standing hegemony of antihemispheric intellectual traditions in Latin America eroded, so that the U.S. proposal for creating the 1889 Pan-American Congress found more welcoming ears in Latin America.

However, the rise of rivals is not necessarily the most powerful antidote to an intellectual tradition. The 1889–1906 case of regime formation shows the

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34 The rise to power of Domingo Sarmiento in Argentina is indicative of this rise of liberalism. Sarmiento was an Argentine version of Alexis de Tocqueville—he traveled through the U.S. in search of clues on how to build democracy back home. In 1887, shortly before his death, he said that "I studied the reasons for the [U.S.'s] extraordinary development, and the bases of its liberties, in order to apply them to our lands. Thus the two extremes of America are linked in a single thought, and are moved by the hope that all the rest will soon follow in this great movement" (in de Onís, 1952:196). Sarmiento's ability to win the presidency—against enormous conservative odds—reveals the growing prestige of liberalism at the time. But Sarmiento, like most other Latin American liberals, failed to consolidate liberal-democratic politics, even though they managed to consolidate liberal, export-oriented economies in their countries (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
limitations of idea-decline through a process of rise in rivals. Whether one intellectual tradition gains or loses strength tells us little about the status of alternative intellectual traditions. In fact, opposing sets of intellectual traditions could gain strength simultaneously, which is precisely what happened at the end of the nineteenth century. In the U.S., for instance, the rise of imperialist sentiments rose in tandem with interest in Pan-Americanism. U.S. imperialists even came to support Pan-Americanism because they saw it as a mechanism for amplifying the capacity of the United States to maneuver in the region and challenge England and Germany. Other Americans supported Pan-Americanism as a way to replicate Prussia’s Zollverein in the Americas—a customs union under a single hegemon. Thus, not all Pan-Americanists in the United States valued association with Latin America for its own sake. And in Latin America, as argued, the rise of liberalism produced a backlash in the form of old Yankeephobia. In short, pro-hemispheric intellectual traditions were becoming stronger in the Americas, which explains the steps that were taken toward cooperation. But antihemispheric intellectual traditions were also rising, which explains why the breadth and scope of the emerging regime were so limited.


As during the late nineteenth century, the 1933-1954 period witnessed a resurgence of liberalism, this time in the form of antitotalitarian thinking. A record number of democratic transitions took place in Latin America between 1944 and 1945, producing again a hemispheric convergence around democratic values. Even the Latin American Left became impressed with the U.S. foreign policy toward fascism. But again, this liberal revival was not a sufficient antidote to antihemispheric intellectual traditions, since the latter also acquired strengths, as previously argued.

What made possible the emergence of a richer regime of cooperation in the 1940s was instead the presence of another mechanism of idea-decline—empirical invalidation. In the 1930s and 1940s, two tenets of antihemispheric intellectual traditions suffered serious empirical challenges. First, the “New Yankeephobia” was challenged by U.S. adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933. Once Roosevelt declared, “The definite policy of the United States from now on is opposed to armed intervention,” the U.S. proceeded to withdraw armed forces from Nicaragua (1933) and Haiti (1954). Despite the rise of security threats (e.g., German expansionism in the Americas) and the rise of political instability and economic nationalism in Latin America in the 1950s (e.g., the 1933 revolution in Cuba; the 1937 expropriation of Standard Oil concessions in Bolivia; the 1938 expropriation of foreign oil holdings in Mexico), the U.S. adhered to its new policy of no military interventions. In the early twentieth century, these circumstances would have unleashed hard-line responses from the U.S. But in the 1930s, the U.S. showed restraint. The Good Neighbor Policy thus disqualified an important antihemispheric intellectual tradition: the notion that the United States was a menace to the region. In that sense, the Good Neighbor Policy turned out to be a major contributor to inter-American cooperation.

Second, Latin America’s active cooperation with the Allies during World War II, in stark contrast to its aloof response during World War I, challenged the No-benefit

35 U.S. antimilitarism had a negative side effect on hemispherm: as Pastor has argued, Roosevelt “swung the pendulum from the extreme of interventionism to absolute silence on internal political issues,” opening the space for the rise of dictators in Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic (1992:188).

36 Not all scholars believe that the Good Neighbor Policy was much of a departure. Smith, for instance, sees it as “the culmination of trends in U.S. policy toward the region,” in essence, “a declaration of triumph in the imperial conquest” (1996:65–66).
doctrine. Latin American nations became one of the most reliable suppliers of primary commodities and defense supplies to the Allies during World War II. Even Mexico contributed by sending an expeditionary force to the Philippines which actually engaged the Japanese in 1945. Latin America’s behavior during the war disconfirmed the notion in the U.S. that Latin American states are unreliable allies that cannot be counted on for security-oriented commitments.

In short, several empirical tests invalidated important tenets of antihemispheric intellectual traditions. Combined with the rise of rivals, empirical invalidation created the space and motivation for a deeper case of hemispherism in the 1940s.

*Idea-Decline Through Institutional De-embeddedness: The Late 1980s*

As in the previous two episodes of regime formation, hemispherism in the 1990s was also the result of a process of idea- decline through the rise of rival intellectual traditions. Once again, liberalism made a comeback, first in politics (the democratization of all Latin American nations except Cuba in the 1980s), and then in economics (the turn to market economies in the 1990s). It was also the result of idea- decline through empirical invalidation. Perhaps the most important empirical invalidation was the resolution of the debt crisis. When the crisis erupted in 1982, neither party wanted to take mutually agreeable positions. Latin Americans eschewed domestic economic reforms, and the United States offered little debt relief. However, after 1989, each party yielded (Cline, 1995). Latin America embraced economic adjustment, disproving the U.S. notion that Latin American nations were economically unreliable, and the U.S. began to offer debt relief (e.g., the Brady Plan), disproving the Latin American notion that the U.S. cared little about the region.

Nevertheless, the most important feature of the late 1990s regime is idea- decline through institutional de-embeddedness. Crucial political institutions at the state, transnational, and societal levels began to shed their antihemispheric modes of thinking, paving the way for the most far-reaching regime of cooperation in the Americas.

*De-embeddedness at the State Level.* In both the U.S. and Latin America, institutions at the government level relinquished antihemispheric thinking. This was especially noteworthy at the state agencies in charge of economics—ministries of the economy in Latin America and the Treasury Department in the U.S. In the late 1980s a new class of pro- hemispheric “technopols” took charge of Latin America’s ministries of economics, and through a process of deep staff and policy changes, converted these ministries from bastions of economic nationalism into bastions of economic liberalism (Domínguez, 1997; Silva, 1997). These ministries’ preference for “trade as aid” was replaced with a preference for “trade instead of aid” (ECLAC, 1994). In the U.S., agencies with jurisdiction over trade policy (e.g., the Trade Representative, the Treasury, Commerce) also changed positions, shifting away from an exclusive preference for globalism (which was hostile to hemispherism) toward an acceptance of regional trade agreements.

De-embeddedness of antihemispheric intellectual traditions also took place, albeit to a lesser extent, in state agencies in charge of political and security issues. Latin America’s ministries of foreign relations adopted less absolute notions of nonintervention. As new democracies, Latin American governments discovered that absolute nonintervention deprives them of international allies in the event of a coup attempt. Governments came to understand that collective involvement in the support of democratic efforts abroad is desirable in part because they, too, might need it. Evidence of this is the 1991 Santiago Resolution of the OAS, which called for a meeting in the event of a “sudden or irregular interruption of the democratically
elected government in any of the Organization’s member states.” This Resolution is more than just an unprecedented code of conduct for the defense of democracy in the region. It is also the most remarkable ever relaxation of the thus-far sacrosanct principle of nonintervention in the twentieth century. The fact that this Resolution was adopted by the OAS, an organism under the jurisdiction of Latin American foreign relations ministries, indicates the extent to which one crucial antihemispheric intellectual tradition became de-embedded from political/security-oriented state bureaucracies. Likewise, security-oriented agencies of the executive branch in the United States also shed their preference for authoritarian clients. By the time of the second Reagan administration, for instance, U.S. foreign policy leaders began to promote democratic transitions, against the wishes of authoritarian clients (e.g., in Chile and in Haiti).

_De-embeddedness at the Transnational Level._ Antihemispheric intellectual traditions were also de-embedded from knowledge-disseminating institutions at the transnational level. By the early 1990s, regional think tanks that were preeminent champions of North–South modes of thinking (e.g., the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC, and the Latin American Economic System, SELA) also began to advocate structural economic reforms along the “Washington Consensus” (i.e., free markets, privatized public services, macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization, deregulation, fiscal discipline) (see, e.g., ECLAC, 1994; Williamson, 1994; Edwards, 1995; IDB, 1996). Much has been written on whether this new model was imposed on Latin America by external actors or not. It is less often recognized, however, that Latin Americans did not embrace the Washington Consensus blindly, but rather made their own amendment: the state should be fortified in some areas such as tax collection, anti-trust regulation, and provision of social services for free markets and macroeconomic stability to endure politically (Bresser Pereira et al., 1994:204; Domínguez, 1997). Many multilateral lending institutions have come to accept this Latin American amendment (see, e.g., World Bank, 1997). In short, transnational institutions dropped old antihemispheric intellectual traditions, giving rise to new epistemic communities of reform-minded practitioners that converged around a modified, pro-integration version of the Washington Consensus.

_De-embeddedness at the Domestic Level._ Finally, antihemispheric intellectual traditions lost significant institutional homes at the domestic level. In Latin America, the most significant change occurred at the level of political parties in the opposition. Historically in Latin America, once a party entered the opposition, it almost automatically turned antihemispheric. This was because nonincumbent political parties, regardless of ideology, tended to regard state-to-state contacts between their country and the United States as advantageous to incumbents only. The old view was that the stronger the international relations of the incumbent, the smaller the chances of defeating the incumbents. In the late 1980s, opposition political parties began to reject this view. They discovered that hemispherialism could actually result in greater pressure on incumbent forces to adhere to democratic procedures, protect human rights, respect oppositions’ rights, and be more accountable in general. In essence, hemispherialism can enhance, rather than block, the opposition’s chance of winning office. The result was an increase in political party demand for hemisphericism. This change in the views of opposition parties in Latin America is one of the most crucial factors explaining Latin America’s turn toward hemisphericism in the 1990s.

Although not nearly as dramatically as in Latin America, society-based demand for hemisphericism also increased in the United States. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of multiculturalism, old and new think tanks, research centers, and
advocacy groups in the United States adopted pro-hemispheric postures (see Wiarda, 1995; Skidmore, 1998:121). During the Cold War, most think tanks in favor of U.S. involvement abroad were divided along two fault-lines: pro-containment vs. pro-humanitarian, and pro–strong ties with Latin America vs. pro–strong ties to other regions of the world. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of multiculturalism in the United States, the first fault-line disappeared and the second one became less significant. The result was a greater convergence among U.S. think tanks and advocacy groups in favor of involvement in Latin America. In addition, the aversion to hemispherism on the part of “border” states such as Texas, Florida, Louisiana, and California also subsided. Traditionally, ties with Latin America appeared more threatening to the more conservative, agribusiness-oriented border states than to the more cosmopolitan, manufacturing-export-oriented northern states. But in the late 1980s, border states found their own export niches in Latin America: California, Texas, and Florida, for example, were among the top four U.S. states in terms of dollar gains in exports to Latin America between 1987 and 1993, which in turn contributed to an expansion in trade with Asia.\footnote{Texas topped the list (sales to Latin America and the Caribbean were up by US$8.7 billion), followed by Michigan (up $4.9 billion), California (up $4.4 billion), and then Florida (up US$4.3 billion) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1994). In addition, Asian corporations have expanded their presence in border states in the 1990s. For instance, by 1995 more than seventeen firms from Korea, forty-five from Japan, and seventy-five from Taiwan had opened up stores in Miami (see Thuermer, 1996; Smith and Malkin, 1997).}

In sum, the inter-American regime of cooperation that emerged in the 1990s was more encompassing than previous regimes because the assault against competing antihemispheric intellectual traditions was the most encompassing in 200 years. Competing intellectual traditions, empirical invalidation, and institutional de-embeddedness (at multiple levels) all combined—for the first time ever—to undermine important tenets of antihemispherism. As a result, the path was cleared for the formation of the broadest regime of cooperation ever.

**Lingering Antihemispheric Intellectual Traditions and the 1998 Summit**

The assault against antihemispheric intellectual traditions was powerful but not definitive. Intellectual traditions can have a fair degree of stickiness. Although the implementation of the 1994 Summit Agreements has exceeded the expectations of many analysts, there are clear signs of a comeback of antihemispheric intellectual traditions throughout the Americas. In part, this is a result of the success of the integration effort so far. Hemispherism is, after all, a form of opening to globalization, which has an ugly side—unwanted flows of migrants, drugs, illegal trade, volatile capital movements, etc. All of this can erode societal demand for international integration. For some leaders of the Left in the U.S., hemispherism is nothing less than renewed imperialism, a threat to the environment, and an opportunity to exploit poor labor conditions abroad. For workers and owners in sectors that cannot compete, free trade is a threat to their livelihoods. For right-wing populists, hemispherism undermines sovereignty, and builds ties with unworthy nations. As a result, an antihemispheric alliance of strange bedfellows—leftists, organized labor, some businesses, and populist nationalists—has captured important political positions in both the Republican and Democratic parties.

In Latin America, likewise, mistrust of the U.S. persists, including parts of the foreign policy establishment and bureaucracies of the largest countries (Mexico and Brazil). Led by Brazil, Latin America’s preference for free trade seems to be changing toward a preference for “free-ish” trade, i.e., maintain exceptions for crucial industries and slow down trade barrier reduction (Katz and Pearson, 1998).
In addition, the decline of antihemispheric thinking has been far less pronounced among nonelites than among elites. In the United States, for instance, while an impressive number of elites (public leaders, governors, leading newspaper editors, business leaders, policymakers, etc.) came to support NAFTA, the U.S. public remained undecided about the desirability of free trade with developing countries. In Latin America, while the intensity of antihemispheric thinking has declined among citizens at large, nationalist antihemispheric leaders continue to elicit broad public support.38

The persistence of antihemispheric thinking among nonelites is a lingering impediment to hemispherism.

The thrust of this article says more about the conditions under which elites develop preferences for hemispherism than about the conditions under which nonelites develop such preferences. A paradigm shift at the level of elites need not translate into a paradigm shift among nonelites. Clearly, the process of idea-decline has spillover effects across nonelite societal actors. Insofar as institutions with ties to society (e.g., think tanks, political parties, NGOs) shed their antihemispheric thinking, nonelite societal actors can be expected to be less antihemispheric. By the same token, the fact that crucial institutions have yet to experience de-embeddedness also explains the persistence of antihemispheric thinking across society.39 Nevertheless, the process of idea-decline specified in this article is neither sufficient nor necessary to bring about changes among nonelites. Sometimes, a change of ideas at the elite level might produce an opposite reaction among nonelites, as is the case when resentful citizens deliberately take counterelite positions. At other times, it is conceivable that nonelites come to embrace ideas for reasons that have nothing to do with the factors that shape paradigm shifts by elites. The conditions under which nonelites shift intellectual paradigms thus remain a topic of further theoretical and empirical research.

The point remains nonetheless that antihemispheric intellectual traditions, among elites and nonelites, continue to pose a threat to inter-American regime development. Signs of a decline in the integration process emerged after 1995 (Inter-American Dialogue, 1997). The congressionally animated process of unilaterally “decertifying” countries in the fight against drugs contradicts the norm of regional cooperation. The congressional denial of fast-track authority in 1997 forced the Clinton administration to falter on its 1994 pledge to incorporate Chile into NAFTA and deepen hemispheric free trade. The need to rescue Mexico after its 1994 Peso crisis gave new fodder to the No-benefit doctrine. Not surprisingly, these sour notes triggered antihemispheric choruses from Latin America. Latin Americans have often denounced the decertification process as imperialist (a return of Yankeeophobia and absolute notions of nonintervention). In response to U.S. wobbling on free trade, Latin Americans began to pursue trade agreements “around the U.S., not with the United States,” as the U.S. Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky, aptly described it. The previously hemispheric-enthusiastic Chile turned its attention to Asia and Mercosur, the regional trade bloc made up of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with a combined GDP of US$1.1 trillion. Mercosur, in turn, is beginning to lure the five nation-members of the Andean Pact,  

38 Since the mid 1990s, Latin America has witnessed the rise of a number of nationalist leaders who embrace some type of antihemispheric rhetoric and obtain significant public support, sometimes doing quite well in elections (e.g., General Lino Oviedo in Paraguay, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Subcomandante Marcos in Mexico, Hugo Banzer in Bolivia).

39 For instance, Latin America’s education ministries, one of the strongest bastions of antihemispheric intellectual traditions, have been relatively exempted from the recent wave of state and economic reforms that swept Latin America in the 1990s (IDB, 1996). The difficulty of changing staff and curriculum in Latin America’s education system means that pre-existing antihemispheric thinking has lingered. Given that these ministries are crucial conduits through which intellectual traditions are passed on to citizens, it is less surprising that antihemispheric thinking continues to linger among nonelites.
flirting with the idea of a South American (rather than hemispheric) free trade area. In February 1998, shortly after the defeat of fast-track, the most influential political bloc in the region, the Rio Group, agreed to forge ahead with plans for closer links with the European Union. 40 In sum, new forms of Yankeephobia, Latin Americanism, Bolivarism, and Universalism have resurfaced in Latin America.

These trends almost imperiled the 1998 Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile. Leading nations of the hemisphere came to the Summit with less enthusiasm for hemispherism than in 1994. The United States was constrained by the lack of fast-track, Mexico and Brazil were at odds over leadership among Latin American countries, Brazil seemed more keen on deepening Mercosur than advancing free trade throughout the Americas, many countries came with increased distrust of neighbors as a result of unresolved border disputes (see Table 4), and many governments were reluctant to adopt stronger anticorruption and antinarcotics regimes. As a result, the 1998 Summit produced less spectacular advances than its Miami predecessor. The more benign goal of universal primary education replaced the more ambitious goal of free trade for all. 41

Nevertheless, at Santiago, the nations reaffirmed and in some areas enhanced the process of cooperation initiated in 1994. The basic tenets of hemispherism—democratic governance, regional economic integration, and social justice—were reaffirmed and specific initiatives were adopted to advance collectively these shared goals. Moreover, whereas the 1994 Summit had closed without a clear vision of the future of summity, the 1998 Summit mandated “periodic” summits. Summit participants agreed that Canada would host the third Summit of the Americas in two to four years. In short, the Santiago Summit demonstrated the continuing robustness of the 1990s regime of cooperation despite the resurgence of some ominous antihemispheric trends.

Conclusion

The one-size-fits-all theoretical approach to the study of regimes in the Americas is inappropriate. As Table 5 shows, power-based theories offer contradictory predictions regarding the emergence of cooperation, none of which fully accounts for all aspects of regime formation in the Americas. Neoliberal institutionalism, with its focus on interdependence, can account for interest in regime formation on some occasions (especially immediately after World War II) and for the relative staying power of regimes once formed, but it cannot fully explain the variation in depths and scopes of regimes. And a cognitivist argument, positing that a convergence around the “Western Hemisphere Idea” (i.e., that hemispheric cooperation is desirable for domestic well-being) is a necessary condition for the rise of hemispherism, is also insufficient. It cannot explain the many times in which commonality of values failed to generate strong regimes of inter-American cooperation.

This article integrates these three approaches along the lines suggested by Hasenclever et al. (1997:217): rather than replace rationalist approaches, cognitivist approaches fill in gaps. Ideas act as intervening variables between “preferences” (which may or may not be accounted for in cognitivist terms) and “outcomes” such as regime formation. In the Americas, the sources and strengths of the preferences on behalf of regimes of cooperation have differed over time. Some times, the source has been external security threats (early nineteenth century, immediately after World War II). Other times the source has been an interest on the part of the hegemon to supply a public good (most of the twentieth century) or an interest on

40 The Rio Group includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela, plus one representative of Central America and one of the Caribbean.

41 For the texts of the Summit visit <http://www.oas.org> or <http://americas.fiu.edu>. 
the part of secondary nations to bandwagon (the late 1940s and early 1990s). On yet other occasions, the preference stemmed from a desire to create institutions that lubricate hemispheric trade (late nineteenth century and maybe even early 1990s) or tame unilateral U.S. military interventions (early twentieth century). Yet on still other occasions, the preference has been the result of commonality of values, especially liberalism (early nineteenth century, late 1940s, and early 1990s).

However, between preferences and outcomes, ideas always stood in the middle, specifically antihemispheric intellectual traditions, which questioned the desirability of hemispheric integration: the No-benefit doctrine in the U.S.; Bolivarism, Latin Americanism, Europeanism, Universalism, Internalism, Land-deprivationism, and Yankeephobia in Latin America. Power asymmetries or “clashes of civilization” alone did not explain the repressed demand for inter-American cooperation, but rather contrarian ideas. In this conceptualization, ideas do not play a prescriptive role, or as Weber (1997) would state it, provide a “theory of selection.” Ideas did not specify the type of regime that nations would select (although they did provide a menu of options). However, ideas did provide a theory of rejection: under conditions of strong antihemispheric intellectual traditions (nineteenth century, early twentieth century, and the Cold War), deep inter-American cooperation was ruled out. Moreover, ideas also played a crucial role in shaping the “net” demand for such regimes. Even when a significant number of international actors wanted regimes of cooperation, their goals were impeded by lingering antihemispheric intellectual traditions. Only when these intellectual traditions declined did the net demand for hemispheric increase.

For regimes to emerge, therefore, obstructionist intellectual traditions need to decline, whether as a result of a rise of competing intellectual traditions, empirical invalidation, or institutional de-embeddedness at the state, transnational, and societal levels. By developing an understanding of how ideas decline, we explained gradations in regime formation that power-based and interest-based arguments could not easily elucidate. Regime formation in the late nineteenth century was the most modest because the process of idea-decline during this period (rise of rivals) was the most modest of all three. Regime formation in the mid-twentieth century went deeper because the process of idea-decline that preceded it was more profound (empirical invalidation plus the rise of rivals). Finally, regime formation in the early 1990s was the richest of all because the assault against intellectual traditions was the

| Table 4. Militarized Disputes Involving Latin American Countries, 1995–1997 |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1995            | Ecuador/Peru    |
|                 | Ecuador/Peru    |
|                 | Colombia/Venezuela |
|                 | Nicaragua/Honduras |
|                 | Nicaragua/Colombia |
| 1996*           | Nicaragua/Honduras |
|                 | Nicaragua/El Salvador |
|                 | Honduras/El Salvador |
| 1997            | Honduras/Nicaragua |
|                 | Nicaragua/Costa Rica |
|                 | El Salvador/Honduras |
|                 | Venezuela/Trinidad and Tobago |
|                 | Venezuela/Colombia |
|                 | Belize/Guatemala |

*Excludes the Cuban shutdown of U.S. registered civilian planes flown by Cuban exiles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Asymmetry</th>
<th>Hegemonic Underwriting</th>
<th>Threatening Hegemon</th>
<th>Extrahemispheric Security Threat</th>
<th>Trade Interdependence</th>
<th>Attrition of Antihemispheric Ideas</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cases of Regime Formation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889–1906</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>1933–1954</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium (only after WWII)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low (except during WWII)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium for the U.S.; variable for L.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cases of Regime Stagnation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1820s–1880s</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (except in Mexico-U.S. relations)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906–1933</td>
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<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Declining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954–1980s</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
most encompassing ever (institutional de-embeddedness, together with rise of rivals and empirical invalidation).

Finally, we argued that, although ideas have quite a powerful (obstructionist) impact on “regime formation,” their impact is less pronounced on the issue of “regime robustness.” Ideas do not seem to undermine existing regimes to the same degree as they hamper their formation. When antihemispheric intellectual traditions made dramatic comebacks in the Americas (early twentieth century, the Cold War), they took a toll, but did not destroy, existing regimes. Regimes never became “wasted assets,” even under unfavorable intellectual climates.

Since 1994, the intellectual climate has turned a bit more antihemispheric. But the 1998 Summit of the Americas shows that institutional arrangements can be effective in countering this trend. Summits in particular send strong political signals that nations are eager to defend existing regimes (Domínguez, 1998), somewhat neutralizing the force of new waves of antihemispheric thinking. Ultimately, however, the future of inter-American cooperation will depend—as it always has—on the extent to which its proponents advance the hemispheric ideal in public debates, embed pro-hemispheric initiatives in effective institutions, and adopt policies that keep antihemispheric intellectual traditions at bay.

References


