Theorizing States’ Emotions

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This article starts from the assumption that emotions are inherently part of life in the international system, but that this is not as well reflected in the discipline of International Relations. The study of emotions can be incorporated more systematically into the discipline through more rigorous theorizing about how states—as main actors in world politics—experience and act on emotions. To do so, I draw on intergroup emotions theory, an emerging area of research in social psychology. This approach points out the process by which groups come to have emotional reactions, and from there how emotions generate intergroup perceptions and intergroup behavior—or foreign policies in the case of states. Understanding states-as-groups addresses many of the criticisms mainstream IR scholars direct toward the study of emotions, including how individual-level factors such as emotions matter for intergroup relationships.

Introduction

The famous declaration by Louis XIV, “l’État c’est moi,” may be fictional, but it does capture the essence of the rule of absolutist kings in that age: the interchangeability between the state itself as an entity and the state’s ruler. But contrary to what International Relations (IR) scholars might think plausible, this identification process is as relevant today, in the era of liberal democracy, as it was during the reign of divine monarchies. We find such interchangeability between individuals and states at play as actors in the international system experience emotional reactions to events and other actors—as groups and not as individuals, whether leaders or not. When “Muslims” around the world—including both citizens and leaders—protested against the Danish cartoons’ depiction of Muhammad, it was not because the cartoons showed them as individuals in a funny light, but because the cartoons insulted the “Muslim” view of what is proper for “Islam” and thus angered the group as a whole. And when “Americans” became fearful and angry after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the overwhelming number of them did so not because they were personally involved in that tragedy, but because they saw the attacks as an attack on “America.”

In this paper, I argue that we can and should theorize more rigorously about how groups in international relations can be said to experience emotions and then take action according to these emotional reactions, and provide a theo-
retical justification for doing so. I suggest here that we can build a requisite foundation by drawing on insights from a specific theoretical framework in social psychology: intergroup emotions theory (IET). Two insights, in particular, stand out from this recently conceptualized approach that can help us construct more rigorous theories about emotions and international behavior through the study of states and “their” emotions: how emotions are aggregated from individuals to groups and how emotions structure and impact on relationships.

It is by now a well-run argument that emotions are neglected in much of IR theorizing but that they are increasingly being utilized in the study of international interactions and phenomena. There is certainly considerable interest in thinking about emotions in IR, but there is little to suggest that emotions are a methodological or epistemological part of an organized, recognized approach to IR or even Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) such that they can become accepted as part of “mainstream” IR. To do this, we need to theorize much more methodically and systematically about how emotions operate at the state level, since states continue to be primary actors of study in IR. In this way, we can conceive of emotions as specifically constitutive or causal, and to trace the pathways by which they influence foreign policy. I do not necessarily mean causal in the strict positivist sense that they must directly cause an outcome; rather, I mean emotions as causal in a broader sense of being a motivator for political behavior (see the discussion in Hansen 2006:2–7). Generalizable theories of emotions will lead to wider applicability and acceptability in IR.

Within the emerging literature on the study of emotions, the tendency is to focus on specific emotions or on specific case studies, without a broader theoretical framework that allows for more analytical rigor and wider application. This means there is a lack of understanding of how states (and also other group actors) can be said to have emotions or to act emotionally in international relations. Both neural scientists and psychologists have demonstrated that individual-level emotional reactions to stimuli tell us whether we are scared, excited, happy, fearful, hopeful, and so on—which then condition our specific responses. Given the manner by which individuals group themselves into social identities, it is logical to argue that such groups also rely on emotions to help them understand their place in the world and how to respond to it.

There are three major ways to discuss emotions as informing state behavior. One is to assume—as much of IR does—that a state is a single actor, indeed, a person (Wendt 2004). In this approach, there is no effort to distinguish among individuals and groups that constitute the state apparatus; it is presupposed that the state speaks with a single voice. Thus, we can talk about “Washington” deciding to sign a climate change treaty or that the “United States” chose to invade Iraq. This method, though, does not provide explicit theorizing about the “state’s” emotions and so remains open to criticism that there is no way to know whether emotions really do matter.

A second way is to focus on individual state leaders as representatives of the state, who make the decisions for the state. This is the primary understanding of FPA (see Hudson 2006). Here, we would focus on the key decision makers and assume their personal characteristics guide state behavior: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s belligerency brought Iran into more conflict with the West. It is certainly useful to think of individual leaders and their emotions, and specific case studies help advance our understanding of how emotions matter in IR. But

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2 A perusal of the programs of various IR annual conferences bears this out. There are also a number of assessments of the field that propose avenues for more and better research: Bleiker and Hutchison (2008); Crawford (2000); Mercer (2006).

3 I follow the notion that mainstream IR means the hegemonic core of American IR. See Friedrichs (2004).

4 For more discussion, see Sasley (2010).
to move beyond such specificity to develop broader, more generalizable theories of emotions—which in turn will help make emotions as theoretical factors more acceptable to larger segments of IR—we need to think beyond individual decision makers.

To do this, we can use a third method: understanding the state as a group and following the internal process by which group members’ (state decision makers’) cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise, and reflect that of the group (state) and so determine how the state will act. There are no assumptions of what the state will do before understanding these processes. This is the common method in organizational theory and, since the late 1970s, has become a prominent technique among social psychologists, including many who study group emotions. One of the critical contributions they have made to the study of groups is to understand the group not just as a corporate entity, but as a psychological process.5

Thinking of states-as-groups also responds to a perennial concern of “state” emotions, namely how the aggregation of individuals’ feelings can be at the same time a group feeling. As expanded on below, emotions are felt by individuals, but individual emotions comprise the group in two ways: the group becomes part of the individual, who then reacts not as that individual but as a member of the group, and individual members of the group converge on the same emotions, so that we can speak of a “single” prototypical emotion. More explicit propositions about individual-to-group emotions transference will help make theorizing about states’ (or other group actors’) emotions more rigorous.

In this article, I provide a theoretical foundation for studying states’ emotions. The first section begins by referencing recent works on emotions in IR, as well as by noting some of the theoretical issues left open in them. This allows me to move to the next section, where I first discuss some of the work in social psychology on groups and next introduce IET. IET is concerned with the manner by which members of a group experience emotions as members of that group when the group—not the individual—is affected by a given event or circumstance. IET traces a multistage process by which group emotions lead to specific behaviors, and I explain each phase of the process, along with the experiments that demonstrate empirical support for them. The third part discusses additional propositions we need to consider in order to apply IET to IR, by understanding the role that state leaders play simultaneously not only as group members but also as the key decision makers for the group. Although I recognize the existence and importance of other actors, I have chosen to focus here on the state and inter-state relations to bring emotions more directly into the center of IR theory. Since much of mainstream IR also concentrates on states, showing the relevance of emotions to state behavior will provide evidence for incorporating emotions as appropriate factors in IR theorizing. The conclusion provides some observations for further consideration, including particular questions IR theorists will need to think about if they wish to utilize emotions as determinants of state behavior.

Emotions in IR

Notwithstanding that emotions have historically been incorporated into thinking on international politics (Crawford 2000), there have been enough summaries of the emerging literature on emotions in IR. Here, I simply describe the handful of recent sophisticated studies on the topic. These are important because they

5See Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987). This psychological process goes beyond the ascriptive, ideational, and normative facets to group formation often highlighted in IR and so provides a further contribution from social psychologists to the study of states-as-groups.
move the study of emotions forward by addressing several methodological, conceptual, and empirical problems. Though small, the growing number of such studies demonstrates the increasing acceptance of emotions among IR researchers.\(^6\)

Paul Saurette (2006) explores the manner in which humiliation impacted on American foreign policy after September 11. He focuses on four main actors: individuals (President Bush), small groups (presidential advisors), a community of strategic planners, and the wider domestic society. He shows that the terrorist attacks were humiliating for all classes of actors, by degrading their senses of self; indeed, he specifically refers to elements of manhood and masculinity as being infringed upon. A violent American counterattack (the war on terror) had to follow, since other responses, such as a criminal-legal one, would not have sufficiently addressed and redressed the shame brought upon Americans. Similarly, but focused on “the other side,” Khaled Fattah and Karin Fierke define emotions as “socially meaningful expressions, which depend on shared customs, uses and institutions” (Fattah and Fierke 2009:70). They demonstrate how the interaction of Middle Eastern Muslim entities with Western states over the centuries has led to feelings of humiliation and betrayal, which in turn have prompted Middle Eastern Islamists to adopt specific narratives and from there policies such as violence against the United States and non-Islamist Muslim governments. Radical Islamists and American foreign and domestic policy (in the context of the war on terrorism) then interact with and continually humiliate each other in a mutually constitutive process (the article’s focus is on extremist Islamists).

In related work, Emma Hutchison contends that “emotions are important sites of not only personal but also political experience” (Hutchison 2010:72). She examines the impact of trauma on the constitution of identity, in the case of the effects of the Bali bombings on Australian identity and perceived necessary foreign policies. Here, emotions are mediums that can bind together all members of a group, connecting those who did not directly experience the memory or trauma with those who did and thus showing how it becomes a group emotion.

Jacques Hymans does address both groups and individual decision makers in his study on nuclear proliferation. Examining why some states choose to build nuclear weapons and others do not, Hymans ties both groups together by arguing that leaders’ national identity conceptions “are individuals’ particular interpretations of the nation’s identity, but these interpretations still rely on the raw material of collective memory” (Hymans 2006:27–28). Thus, individual leaders were not necessarily present or involved in past decisions, but as members of the national group, they draw on such experiences to inform their decisions.

Finally, Löwenheim and Heimann (2008) brilliantly present a careful process by which moral outrage, humiliation, and situational constraints determine whether a country will seek revenge (and the emotional satisfaction it provides) on those who harmed it. Examining Israeli actions in the lead up to and against Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon War, they come very close to the model suggested by IET—though they do not lay out as clear a theoretical thread in the individual-to-group emotion transference process.

This literature has gone a long way toward explicit theorizing about emotions. But an examination of their theoretical frameworks suggests avenues for further development: One, the studies mentioned are all single-emotion studies; it is not clear how other emotions formed in response to perhaps less dramatic—but no

\(^6\)Unfortunately, many—though by no means all—of these studies fall within the poststructuralist or critical constructivist approach to IR, which means that other paradigms are under-represented in the emotions in IR literature. Thus, the unintentional focus here is on the former, but without meaning to suggest that emotions should only be a constructivist or postpositivist “thing.” Indeed, it should be stressed that emotions are relevant for all IR approaches.
less causally important—events might operate at the group level and inform group behavior. Two, the studies tend to focus on specific negative emotions (anger, humiliation, revenge) and outcomes (violence), without accounting for whether other, more positive emotions are equally affective in determining policies. In addition, they seem less able to distinguish between different policy outcomes stemming from the same emotion. Three, in some cases, these studies are less about states-as-groups and more about general policy preferences that flow from general emotional reactions of more amorphous groups. Although studying nonstate actors is necessary, if we are to make emotions part of mainstream IR theorizing, we must be able to tie them also into state behavior. Four, there is not always a clear distinction between individual-level and group-level emotional reactions. The specification of the emotions-to-policy process at the group level needs more precise theorizing, so that the findings are made more widely applicable (not to mention the methodological difficulties and high costs inherent in individual-level studies). The discussion of IET below addresses these issues by providing a general model of group emotions and behavior.

Social Psychology and Theorizing about Group Emotions

In the past, some IR scholars did utilize group-level psychological processes to explain foreign policy decision making. They worked primarily on small group decision making and in contexts of crises and deterrence (for example, Janis and Mann 1977; Lebow 1981, 1996: Chapter 13; Jervis, Lebow, and Gross Stein 1985; Lebow and Gross Stein 1993). There are several differences between these earlier studies and the social psychological approach discussed here. First, the previous focus was on cognitive processes (often defined as “motivations”) and not on emotional processes. Second, the earlier purpose was to explain poor or ineffective decision making, and bad or wrong decisions, whereas I am concerned with developing a general approach that can explain decisions and behaviors of any kind. Third, that literature only examined small groups engaged in a decision-making process, while my use of the term “group” is broader and thus better able to theorize about states’ emotions and bring emotions from a primarily individual-level focus to a larger group-level model.

In this section, I expand on these earlier studies to explore how groups come into existence and, through this very process, impact on decisions emanating from that group. Although we might know an emotion when we see its manifestation, there are serious debates over how to define emotions and how they are generated. However, both psychologists and neural scientists have shown that emotions are important components of human decision making. Beginning in the 1970s and into the 1980s, social psychologists made great progress in determining that individuals do come together to form a group system, and it is through this process that emotion theorists have shown that groups have emotions.

Groups are not simply the aggregation of individuals, and understanding them as such would not help us understand or theorize about group emotions. As Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead ask, would it make a difference if several individuals happened to feel the same emotions at the same time? (2005:87). This does not necessarily translate into an active “group” emotion or, especially, any group behavior since there is nothing to suggest that feeling similar emotions leads to specific shared reactions.

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7Hymans is a notable exception, in that he explicitly theorizes about pride.
8For two overviews, see Elster (1999) and Kagan (2007).
9On emotions as generated from individual psychological processes, see Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone (2001). On emotions as neural–biological processes, see Damasio (1994).
Social Identity Theory and Group Categorizations

Social psychologists have conceived of different ways to define groups (for example, ibid., 89–91) but an appropriate and effective definition comes from social identity theory and self-categorization theory, which IET has explicitly built on. Social identity theory (SIT) grew out of Henri Tajfel’s dissatisfaction with how contemporary psychologists understood intergroup stereotypes. The problem, he argued, was that stereotypes were studied as essential individual-level cognitive phenomena, but that this ignored the very real social contexts that produced stereotypes (see Tajfel 1981). Otherwise, why would an individual in one social group hold a stereotype of individuals in another social group without even having interacted with them? Tajfel noted that stereotypes in fact serve social, and not just individual, functions: to help understand complex, large-scale social events; to justify behavior toward outgroups; and to differentiate the ingroup from outgroups (ibid., 156).

Tajfel defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (ibid., 255; his emphasis). Individuals certainly hold views about the place of their own self-identity in the world, but at the same time because individuals purposely group themselves together, it stands to reason that they also see themselves as members of these groups. As they do so, individuals come not just to be members of a group, but to identify closely with the group, adopting its perceptions and representations as their own: “To the extent that group membership defines them, people do not think of themselves as unique individuals, but rather as relatively interchangeable members of the group” (Mackie, Maitner, and Smith 2009:287; also Hogg and Abrams 1998; Brown and Capozza 2006). Tajfel and others found clear evidence of this process: even when individuals were brought together into experimental groups, without any previous history of contact between or knowledge of each other, they automatically responded by showing favoritism to the members of the ingroup rather than members of an outgroup and thus cohesion among the former and discrimination toward the latter (see Turner et al. 1987:27–28).

This finding proved important for how we understand groups to exist, how they perceive themselves as such, and how to avoid tautology when constructing theories about group identity and behavior. Originally, Tajfel believed that if the members of a group consider themselves members, then the group exists (1981:230–31). But he later qualified this idea by noting that, in the case of the cognitive facet to social identity, the consensus among group members on being a group “may often originate from other groups and determine in turn the creation of various kinds of internal membership criteria within the ingroup.” He gave the example of Jews in pre-Holocaust Europe, whose group identity “had as much to do with the consensus in the outgroups about the existence of a distinct group known as ‘Jews’ as with the corresponding ingroup consensus” (ibid., 232; his emphasis; Worcel, Iuzzini, Coutant, and Ivaldi 2000:27–28).

If we did not consider ourselves as belonging to a group, we could not have social norms of behavior—and each individual would act however he or she pleases. Clearly, this is not the case, and it is because individuals perceive themselves as members of groups, each of which has its own set of behavioral expectations. The self is as much social as it is personal. Once we know that individuals perceive themselves as part of a group, we must then realize that “[n]o group lives alone—all groups in society live in the midst of other groups” so that aspects of social identity “only acquire meaning in relation to, or in comparisons with, other groups” (Tajfel 1981:256). And we know that comparisons, however benign or malicious, can be made simply by virtue of the existence of different
groups: as Hogg and Abrams put it, “groups can be considered to have an objective existence to the extent that members of different groups believe different things, dress in different ways, hold different values, speak different languages, live in different places, and generally behave differently” (1998:2).

The notion that social identity comes into play in social (that is, intergroup) situations was enhanced by self-categorization theory (SCT), created by students of Tajfel’s who sought to expand on SIT. They wanted to better understand how individuals categorized themselves as part of specific social groups, and from there to explain intergroup behavior. SCT was more precise about the psychological process by which individuals switched from their personal identity to a social or group identity. It explored the process by which individuals came together to form a “social-psychological system” that broadened (but not subsumed) their identity from their individual self to a “supra-individual” identity—that is, a social group (Turner et al. 1987:viii).

SCT defines a group as “one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms and values, … that they privately accept membership in, and which influences their attitudes and behaviour” (ibid., 1–2). Individuals group themselves into social categories by existing in the same interpersonal space, and because of the psychological benefits that groups provide to individuals—indeed, both SIT and SCT were clear that individual-to-group identification was based on psychological needs. According to SCT, as individuals “people are motivated to evaluate themselves positively and that in so far as they define themselves in terms of some group membership they will be motivated to evaluate that group positively, that is, people seek a positive social identity” (ibid., 29–30). In other words, groups “can serve as a vehicle for social identification and [by doing so] can constitute an important and meaningful aspect of people’s identity” (Smith and Mackie 2008:429).

The process by which this occurs is called “depersonalization,” in which individuals begin to see themselves as “interchangeable exemplars of a social category [rather] than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences” (Turner et al. 1987:50). Individuals do retain their individual sense of self; SCT did not suggest that the group is the orientation point at all times. Rather, their sense of self as part of a larger social identity only becomes relevant under certain circumstances, when social categorization is activated by cues that make the categorization more salient than the individual sense of self (Mackie et al. 2009:286).

These cues can really be anything that marks a difference between groups, including “hearing a foreign language, seeing a group symbol, engaging in cooperative or competitive behavior with ingroups or outgroups,” and so on (ibid.). Depersonalization and social categorization prompt individuals to understand themselves as part of one group compared to another. The ingroup becomes the defining feature of their identity: they do not see themselves as individuals looking at other individuals but as members of an ingroup looking out at members of an outgroup. Once they adopt this perspective, they take on the attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, and eventually action tendencies of the group. In this way, they make the group part of the self, to the point that they may even identify more closely with the ingroup than they identify themselves as non-members of an outgroup (Smith and Henry 1996).

**Intergroup Emotions Theory**

Building on the study of group processes, intergroup emotions theorists have conducted an increasing number of clinical experiments to explain how emotions are relevant at both the agent level (that is, how groups can be said to have
emotions) and the structure level (that is, how intergroup interactions are produced by and produce emotions and, from there, reactions and behaviors). IET researchers incorporate social identity theory and self-categorization theory, but note that while these two approaches mention the emotional connections that link individuals into groups, they do not explicitly theorize about how this impacts on individuals in the group-formation process or on intergroup behavior (Smith and Mackie 2008:429). The focus on cognitive processes means observers miss critical facets to the creation of social identities and group conduct. IET addresses these gaps by an explicit focus on emotions as determining group behavior.

At the same time, IET is concerned with—and in this way made more relevant for application to IR—the functional role that emotions play for intergroup behaviors. Its purpose is not just to recognize that emotions matter for intergroup behavior, but to specify how they matter. It has been demonstrated that emotions are effective, even necessary in some instances, means of communicating between individuals. As Robert Frank tells us, a thief is less likely to steal something from an out-of-towner (that is, someone he does not know) if he knows the potential victim feels strongly about the item in question and would absorb high costs in order to retrieve the item and punish the criminal (Frank 1993:163). Similarly, Fischer and Manstead argue that “[e]motions are elicited and evolve in social contexts, and they help us to deal with the challenges posed by our social environment” (Fischer and Manstead 2008:464). They can, for example, help strengthen bonds of loyalty within groups, allowing for individuals to better respond to environmental changes.

At its most basic, intergroup emotions are defined as “emotions that arise when people identify with a social group and respond emotionally to events or objects that impinge on the group” (Smith and Mackie 2008:428). To demonstrate this, IET posits a multistage process by which emotions become group feelings that in turn lead to group behavior. These stages include the activation of an individual’s member-of-group identity; the appraisal of an event or issue in terms of how it affects the group; the generation out of this experience of group emotions; and group behavior.

In Smith and Mackie’s terms, “when someone in an intergroup situation is responding in terms of a social identity, object or events that affect the ingroup will elicit emotional responses, because the group becomes in a real sense an aspect of the person’s psychological self” (ibid., 429). In the same way that emotions help individuals understand and react to their environments, and similar to the psychological assistance that groups provide for individuals, so too are emotions necessary frameworks for helping individuals in the form of groups interpret the world around them. Careful study of the IET model will allow IR scholars to apply such or similar processes to theorizing about states’ emotions.

The first stage involves the activation of social identity among individuals. The initiation of social identity, as explained by SIT and SCT, provides psychological benefits to individuals, so that the group becomes part of the psychological self. Stereotypes, Tajfel posited “can become social only when they are ‘shared’ by large numbers of people within social groups or entities” (1981:145; his emphasis). IET focuses on the emotional processes that occur from this point instead and argues that the “activation of group membership produces convergence of emotions as well as attitudes and behaviors” (Seger, Smith, and Mackie 2009:461). Indeed, it is

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10IET also builds on appraisal theories of individual emotions, but I do not focus on these foundations for the specific purpose of studying groups here. For more on this incorporation, see Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000:602).

11For others among a wide variety of examples, see Damasio (1994); Frank (1988); Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001); Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002); Finucane, Peters, and Slovic (2003).
argued that “membership in a group is itself sufficient to determine emotional experience” (Rydell, Mackie, Maitner, Claypool, Ryan, and Smith 2008:1141–42). The critical element in this equation is that, as with group identification more generally, individuals do not have to be directly involved in a given triggering situation, because simply identifying with the group produces emotional transference and shared emotional experience.

Group emotions can be activated by obvious precipitating events. In experimental studies, IET has primarily focused on explicit manipulation of social identity, by telling subjects that they are members of a specific group. Recent research, though, has shown that even beyond such unambiguous cues, individuals can be “primed” to determine whether they experience group emotions. In one study, individuals were asked about their emotions before any group identity was activated (Seger et al. 2009). They then listened to four different music clips, including the Star-Spangled Banner (an American identity) and the Indiana University (IU) fight song (to prime IU identity, where the study took place). After each song, subjects rated how much they liked the song, its perceived complexity, and again their emotions (“As an American/IU student...”) And they were asked whether they recognized the songs. The results showed that after each prime, individual emotions significantly converged to a typical emotion, thus leading to group emotions.

A second study primed using a series of photographs (such as the White House for the American identity and campus buildings for the IU identity). Subjects were asked about their emotions only once, to avoid the possibility from the first experiment that they might have thought it necessary to report different emotions since they were asked twice. After seeing the pictures, they rated their emotions, then answered questions about group identification as American or IU students, and then rated emotions on that basis (“As an American, how do you feel?”). The results were strengthened: individual-level emotions converged on group emotions, much greater than for control groups.

These findings are highly relevant for understanding state emotions and interstate behavior. Members of states often demonstrate their identity as the state-as-group through the use of public rhetoric and symbols such as flags, anthems, and so on. But they do not rant or display such objects all the time; and yet their identification with the group—the state—does not diminish in the absence of these cues.

Equally important, IET has found that higher levels of identification with a social identity are more likely to produce convergence on prototypical group emotions, as well as more intense feelings. In the experiments discussed above, it was found that those who identified more with “America” or “IU” (“high identifiers”) converged more toward group-level emotions. Mackie, Smith, and Ray (2008:1872) cite an unpublished study they conducted (with others) that highlighted this: individuals were asked about their personal levels of fear and then their fears as Americans. The results indicated a higher level of fear. Then, they were told of a study showing Americans felt high levels of fear; when subjects were reminded they were Americans, they reported feeling the same levels of fear as reported in the study, while those not reminded but made to think they were again individuals had levels that remained the same as the first outcome (see also Rydell et al. 2008). Stronger identification leads to more typical and intense group emotions. Still other research has found that levels of identification tend to be higher when groups are engaged in conflict with each other (Mackie et al. 2000). The explanation for this specific process is simple: feeling

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12See also Mackie et al. (2009); Smith and Henry (1996); Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007).

13Interestingly, the American prime activated a higher ingroup identification and stronger convergence than the IU prime.
strongly about your own group identity fits more easily with the self-stereotypes groups create for themselves by viewing their group more positively than they view outgroups (Turner et al. 1987:29–30).

The consequences of this are important for understanding group behavior in general and state behavior in particular. Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) found that in the case of “bad” ingroup behavior toward an outgroup, those who do not identify strongly with the group might feel guilt, while those who identify strongly with the ingroup might feel pride or embarrassment (depending on their levels of identification). As discussed below, this leads to different action tendencies, for example, reparations versus justifications.

Finally, ingroup identification holds not just for situationally activated cures, but is “chronic and long-lasting” as well. Though circumstances are an important precipitating factor, IET also argues that group emotions develop out of group membership, with or without a specific precipitating event. Seger, Smith, and Mackie give the example of a woman who is actively involved in women’s rights organizations. For her, she interprets everyday events in light of how they impact on women as a social category, in addition to impacting on her as an individual woman, so that “[g]roup-based emotional responses … would naturally follow, and would be difficult to disentangle from emotions that the woman experiences as an individual based on events that affect only her (and not her group)” (2009:465). As discussed below, this process is critical for understanding states-as-groups, with leaders of states substituting for the woman in this example.

The second phase of the group emotional process takes place when individuals within the group appraise a given situation or development, to determine its effects. But given the identification with the social group, they appraise such circumstances not for how they impact on themselves as individuals, but for how they affect the group itself. Importantly, this holds for members who are not directly engaged in a given situation that involves the group. Because of the deep identification process, conditions that affect the group’s well-being are considered to affect individuals within the group, prompting the latter’s emotional reaction regarding the group (Smith and Henry 1996; Mackie, Silver, and Smith 2004; Smith et al. 2007). In all cases of international interactions impacting on the state, the overwhelming majority of state members are not involved in any given interactive sequence, and yet public opinion polls often show emotional reactions on the part of these non-involved members.

Individuals do not just feel for ingroup members; they feel as ingroup members (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Gordijn 2003; Mackie et al. 2004:230; Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008:1873). Individuals who self-categorize to a specific group see the world through that group’s “eyes.” Not every individual who watches a soccer match between his or her national team and another’s national team actually plays in the game. And yet, the non-playing group members get very emotional about the developments and outcome of the match; anyone who has watched British soccer would recognize this process instantly. Fitting with findings on high identifiers discussed above, studies have determined that the closer fans identified with their preferred soccer team, the angrier they were after a loss (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, and Turner 2007). Spears and Wayne Leach (2004) extended the logic of this argument and found that on the basis of their identification with their own national group, people took pleasure in the poor standing (defeat) of a rival national team by a third national team.14

The process need not include such high-intensity experiences. As Garcia, Miller, Smith, and Mackie (2006) note, a female student will react differently to the compliment that she did well on a test, than she would if the compliment

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14Soccer seems to be an ideal experimental arena for studying group emotions.
included the group-identifying feature, “for a woman.” Another study found that group members (first from two separate departments within the same university and then from two different universities) felt angrier when other clearly identified members of the same group (same department or same university) became victims of a computer crime by a member of an outgroup (cited in Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, and Gordijn 2003:535–36).

Seeking to determine the strength of this identification-appraisal equation, Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Dumont (2006) experimented with individuals not personally involved in a perpetrator–victim relationship and manipulated the salience of similarities to both of these groups. They hypothesized that, even for a completely uninvolved individual, “a focus on the similarities with victims would increase the perception of the behavior as unfair and anger would be the consequence. In contrast, when the links with the perpetrators are being stressed, the behavior is likely to be seen as justified and chances are that they are not angry” (ibid., 16). The results confirmed this: “participants who saw themselves in the same category as the perpetrators ... showed a pattern of emotions and behavioral reactions that is likely to be found among the actual perpetrators. Specifically, when the context stressed membership to the same category as perpetrators, participants ... seemed to experience less anger when they identified more as opposed to less with the group” (ibid., 27).

Following on this, appraisals give way to the third stage, which is the generation of intergroup emotions. Groups appraise situations all the time, simply by being aware of them, even if to dismiss them as irrelevant. But it is only when a situation is considered to impact on the ingroup that intergroup emotions are generated, and individuals come to feel group emotions. This is one of IET’s important contributions to the study of emotions in IR. IET posits that groups experience emotions based on how individuals within the group appraise a given situation as impacting on the group itself. Specific appraisals lead to specific emotions, but these emotions are contingent on the particular intergroup context relevant at a given time. This finding is highly relevant for the study of interstate behavior, given that—as a range of IR paradigms have demonstrated—decisions might be determined by specific causal factors (whether international forces or other material incentives, national identity, domestic politics, and so on) but other factors impact on policy implementation and outcomes.

Several studies (discussed below) have explored the generation of anger in intergroup settings, based on how individuals—again, not involved in a given development but aware that fellow group members were—reacted to events that impacted on the ingroup. Anger, though, might be among the easier emotions to generate. Harder to replicate among individuals not involved in a given group activity, particularly non-members of the group, is fear.

Dumont et al. (2003) sought to address this deficiency through an experiment conducted on European subjects 1 week after September 11. Their experiment consisted of one study in Holland and one in Belgium. It was suggested that outsiders would be expected to react with some sadness, anger, and even some levels of fear to September 11, but having not been directly affected would understandably experience different levels of emotional reactions. In the case of the fear emotion, Europeans could reasonably feel they had less to fear because the attacks were specifically targeted against Americans and the United States (hence the choice of targets and public rhetoric from Islamist extremists afterward) and not against Europeans and Europe. Thus, manipulating an identification with an ingroup composed of Americans in addition to Europeans, it was hypothesized, would prove the relevance of social identity salience and emotions.

To this end, participants were put into a “Western” identity (which included Europeans and Americans) compared with an “Arab” identity and then
a “European” versus “American” identity. As predicted, it was found that levels of fear were higher for “Westerners” than for “Europeans”: “Westerners” reported more fear and stronger fear-related action tendencies than when “Americans” were categorized as an outgroup (while levels of sadness and anger were not affected by the change in identity).

Finally, at the last stage, IET is concerned with real-world applicability of its theories and so studies the effects (or regulation) of intergroup emotions on intergroup behavior. Drawing again on SIT, social identity is considered “an intervening causal mechanism” because it influences how groups perceive and act toward other groups (Tajfel 1981:276). A group’s emotions determine the group’s action tendencies (inclinations toward a specific behavior) and thus actual behavior.

Anger and subsequent tendencies to confront the offending group has been one of the more common emotional assessments in IET. Mackie et al. (2000) first established that the angrier an ingroup is toward an outgroup, and the stronger the former feels it is vis-à-vis the latter, the more likely the ingroup will adopt more aggressive responses toward the outgroup (see also Smith et al. 2007; Seger et al. 2009), while others have shown how in opposition, fear prompts a “desire to avoid the outgroup, help victims, or seek relevant information” (Rydell et al. 2008:1142). DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, and Cjdric (2004) concluded from experimental tests of group reactions that when an ingroup felt angry toward an outgroup, the ingroup was more likely to experience “automatic prejudice” (negative reactions) about the outgroup, on the basis that anger is associated with intergroup competition and rivalry.

Experiments conducted by Rydell et al. (2008) incorporated a “misattribution” process to determine whether intergroup anger was genuine or whether it could in fact be attributed to another cause apart from intergroup contexts. In one study, each participant sat alone in a small room at a computer console. All subjects were told they had to read an essay by a foreign student on his impressions of Americans and the United States while he was in the country. Participants were randomly assigned an essay that praised or insulted their ingroup (Americans), including having respect or little respect for Americans and their values.

Before reading the essay, half of the participants were given the “misattribution manipulation”: They were told that the researchers also wanted to study the physical setting of the experiment and how it might affect their emotional responses, and given different descriptions of this impact, based on if they were part of the “insult” or “praise” group. Those in the “insulted condition” were told that previous participants complained about working in the cubicles, felt isolated, and thought the lights were too dim, leading them to feel “tense and irritable during the study.” Those in the “praised condition” were told that previous testees mentioned they liked the sereneness of the workplace and were “content and pleased.” Those not in these misattribution groups were not told anything.

Next participants had to rate their emotions on a scale, answering emotion-related questions about how they felt as an American. Then, they responded to three questions about the content of the essay: how insulting or praising it was to Americans and the United States; what kind of opinion the person who wrote it had about the United States and Americans (negative or positive); and how likeable is the person who wrote the essay. Results bore out IET’s predictions: participants felt angrier after reading the insulting essay. Importantly, participants were angrier in the control condition than in the misattribution

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15See the discussion in Rydell et al. (2008).
16For full studies, see Dumont et al. (2003); Yzerbyt et al. (2003).
condition: “reported anger was reduced in response to an insulting essay about one’s group when arousal could be misattributed to an external source (for example, the small room) compared to when it could not” (ibid., 1144).

Critically for IR, IET has determined at the same time that “emotion promotes some forms of intergroup behavior and prevents others” (Mackie et al. 2004:230). Behavior is conditioned on the specific intergroup context: the specific emotion and the constraining conditions. Emotions are inherently part of “the context dependent, the interactional, [and] the relational” (ibid., 228). They act as antecedents to group behavior, but in the process of the resulting intergroup behavior, they condition group responses. All of this is played out in a collective context: It is not that the individual who feels threatened by an outgroup will, for example, react aggressively against that group; it is that the individual feels the ingroup is threatened and so will react aggressively (Mackie and Smith 1998:511). The identification of the individual with the group under a given circumstance permits this kind of reaction transference. For example, the United States has long feared Iraqi, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear programs, but it has composed quite different foreign policies to deal with each situation.

More specifically, Mackie and Smith (ibid.) showed that, contrary to general assumptions about views regarding immigration patterns, immigrant groups may not elicit negative prejudices from majority “native” groups so long as the former take on manual labor. But as immigrants begin to effectively compete for skilled labor, which the latter usually perceive as belonging to them, prejudice, discrimination, and other consequences can result.17 In other words, the specific condition (employment statistics and perceptions) leads to alternate feelings than would otherwise be the case.

Because social contact between groups is intimately related to the emotions experienced by the constituent groups to a given interaction, the intensity of the emotional experience can shape group behavior even in the face of material disincentives. Elisabeth Wood (2001), for example, found that peasants in El Salvador participated in a rebellion/social movement against the government at least in part because of the emotional benefits doing so provided them: the reconstitution of their dignity through their own agency. They did so even in the face of harsh repression by the state and the same material benefits that accrued to those who did not participate in the rebellion as much as they did to those who did participate.

IET also notes that as conditions change, or a given interaction is completed, so do group emotions and the behaviors they recommend change. Emotions are “episodic states”: an (emotional) occurrence at a specific point in time that may last only for a short burst of time or for a very long period (Smith and Mackie 2008:176). Thus, once the emotion generates a behavior, the behavior can change the condition. Once that happens, the emotion can dissipate since it is no longer necessary to drive a given behavior. In other words, once a particular interactive sequence is finished, the emotions associated with that sequence change or wane because they are no longer necessary for helping the group calculate specific responses. Entering an emotional state does not freeze an individual into place. Even less does it do so for states, which, under the conditions of the international system, must constantly engage in interactions with other states. For example, Maitner, Mackie, and Smith (2006) determined that once an emotion-induced behavior (anger that produces a retaliatory assault on an attacking outgroup) runs its course, the ingroup will likely feel satisfaction. This is because the original emotion (anger) is dissipated by the retaliatory strike.18 IET’s propositions can be reconceptualized in Figure 1.

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17For more examples, of both expected and actual behavior, see Dumont et al. (2003).
18The study did not account for success or failure of the retaliatory behavior.
None of this is to imply a deterministic condition to the emotion-behavior equation. We need to be careful how much weight we place on emotions as cause in a given relationship (see Armon-Jones 1986:58–59), particularly as we seek to apply the model to the complexity of world politics. Still, the evidence is strong for all of the hypotheses discussed above, with the obvious caveat that the group-based emotions process may not necessarily work the same under all conditions; nor would we expect all states to follow the theoretical propositions in every circumstance.

**Thinking of States-as-Groups with Emotions**

A state is of course a large and complex entity. But it is still a group. As such, the sense of belonging to the state means that citizens of the state, including decision makers, share in their psychological–emotional identification with the group enough to react as a group to an event or development. In turn, this impacts on foreign policies. The primary contribution of IET to IR lies in this process: studying states-as-groups allows us to consider the state—as the psychological–emotional group—changing its members to think, feel, and react similarly so that we can speak of “state” emotions. IET’s position that group emotions are not about aggregation of individuals’ emotions but rather about the process by which the group becomes part of the individual self and the convergence of emotions within the group to a prototypical emotion that can be said to be a group emotion is important to avoid misperceptions about and mistheorizing of state emotions.

The multistage process described above can be applied to theorizing about the emotions of states and the impact of such emotions on state behavior. But the conditions and contexts under which foreign policy is made are different in many ways from the experiments that have proven the appropriateness of the IET model. In addition, foreign policy decisions are clearly not made by the entire group but rather specific individuals classified as state leaders or decision makers. To utilize IET within an IR context, we need therefore to append other explanatory variables to the IET model in order to theorize about how decisions can be made by individuals in the context of the group but without morphing into overly reductionist theories that in reality are applicable only to individuals and thus cannot be said to fit into a group-level interactive approach.

To do this, we must demonstrate why states-as-groups is an effective approach to bringing emotions into IR beyond simply focusing on individual state leaders. We must show that as members of a group, state leaders may make the formal decisions, but they do so within a particular (social) context and on that (social) basis. To hypothesize the process by which these leaders as members of the group make decisions as part of that group, I suggest multiple avenues by which these connections can be drawn. The empirical examples below are not fully developed case studies; they are meant to be suggestive and provide plausibility.

First, the conditions under which group members consider themselves as such—and react on that basis—should be specified to a greater degree. Social
psychologists have demonstrated that intergroup conflict is not necessary for ingroup identification. However, in IR, we should shift to a greater emphasis on the existence of one or many outgroups, including conditions of conflict, competition, and cooperation. States are created specifically to shelter, protect, and advance the interests of one particular group of people against other groups of people. In a world of a multitude of interacting actors, outgroups are always present and impacting on the ingroup, in all kinds of issue areas. It should also be noted that in no group does every member feel precisely the same, and all groups retain elements of disagreement within them. But in theoretical terms, we think of groups as general concepts orienting the majority of its members.

Various literatures in IR do study how outgroups condition ingroup behavior, by building on identity as mattering for group behavior in the international system. But identity as a motivator for state behavior is a vehicle for representing specific emotions that a state holds toward another state. As William Connolly (1991) has noted, the identity of a given group is based on a sense of difference from other groups. But that understanding of difference is not just a cognitive process, particularly when it is built on a foundation of threat and challenge—which in turn are built on emotional scaffolds, such as fear. States can thus only identify themselves as themselves when they feel that other states are different. In other words, intergroup relations may well be necessary for constituting group identity and the subsequent emotions that are generated out of that realization of difference (for example, Campbell 1998; Wendt 1999; Hansen 2006; Steele 2008).

Consider the Israeli reaction to a potential independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG). Although by “Israel” commentators normally mean the majority Jewish population and the Jewish political establishment that holds decision-making authority in the state, both are rent with religious, political, and ideological disagreements, with different political parties espousing very different—sometimes radically opposite—ideas regarding relations with the Palestinians. Indeed, the conventional depiction of Israeli politics is that of a continuum between right (hawkish toward the Palestinians and opposed to giving up any land in the WBG) and the left (dovish and inclined toward territorial compromise or withdrawal).

Yet despite such distinctions, a clear majority of Israelis share similar views about the peace process and the nature of the Palestinians (and their leadership). At moments of increased violence in the relationship, such similarities are enhanced. One study of Israeli public opinion over time found that such conditions shaped common Israeli perceptions and opinions, making it possible to speak of Israel-as-a-group when detailing how “Israel” feels about “the Palestinians.” In the aftermath of the onset of the Second Intifada, in September 2000, between 54% and 70% of Jewish-Israelis did not think it possible to achieve peace with the Palestinians, despite the fact that over the same period between 50% and 60% supported the creation of a Palestinian state in the WBG (Ben Meir and Bagno-Moldavsky 2010:82, 76). These were large majorities in both cases. To be sure, these figures represent direct security concerns arising out of conditions of conflict. But they also contain clues about the nature of Israeli identity, as it is shaped under these conditions of threat. During this same period, the importance of the West Bank as an element of Israeli identity opposite a Palestinian identity composed of the same territory increased from 9% to 36% (ibid., 23).

19Although it may seem disingenuous to bracket here the large Arab minority in Israel (20%), the complexity of the conditions requires us to do so for this specific example. In any event, evidence also suggests that when it comes to at least some Israeli policies regarding negotiations with the WBG Palestinians (for example, on borders), many Palestinian citizens of Israel share the same preferences with the Jewish leaders.
A further test of this proposition can also be found in conditions of non-conflict. Drawing from the Middle East again, we can examine the Egyptian–Israeli relationship. A peace treaty has governed relations between the two since 1979 and has been strictly adhered to even when Israel has engaged in armed conflict with Egypt’s fellow Arab states (for example, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982). And yet despite this peace, the Egyptian population has continued to see itself as different from Israel, with a different worldview, culture, norms, and policy expectations regarding the broader Israel–Arab relationship. The peace is often described as a “cold peace,” due to the hostile attitude Egyptians maintain toward Israel. The fact that the sentiments are not mutual (Israelis holiday in the Sinai Peninsula in larger numbers and visit Egypt proper too; an Egyptian professional doing so in Israel would likely be blacklisted by his or her professional association) is highly relevant.

What is interesting in this analysis is that Egyptians view Israel very poorly because of Israel’s relations with others (the Israeli–Palestinian conflict). Even when violent conflict is not taking place, the continuing Israeli occupation of the WBG and the stoppages in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process continue to shape the Egyptian group’s opinion about Israel toward a negative perception, despite direct conditions of an official cooperative relationship (see Barnett 1998; Furia and Lucas 2006). The awareness of Otherness between Egypt and Israel is enough to override these “positive” contours. A discussion of group emotions in IR should take this sense of difference into account.

Second, decision-making authority is a necessary component to any approach theorizing about state emotions and foreign policy, so that we do not speak of “state” emotions at an abstract level but can show how they matter in practice. But the connections between individuals’ emotions and groups’ emotions have been missing in much of the emotions and IR literature and must be better specified.

Decision making—that is, the role of individual leaders—is of course the very premise of the FPA literature. The claim to decision-making authority for the state is not open to everybody: state leaders are those imbued with authoritative legitimacy simply by virtue of being the leaders—that is, they are accepted as such (Doty 1996; Weldes 1996). At the same time, the policy ideas attributed to a “state” are in fact often symbolized by an individual or a small group of individuals who are the “most important representatives of the ideas”; their personal histories become entwined with the policy ideas they promote and that the state adopts and makes policy (Sikkink 1991:244–245).

Leaders are the ones who must interact with other leaders, make the case for their policies, and explain them and justify them not only to their own citizens but to others as well. As the key decision makers, state leaders are widely perceived as being the representatives of the state to the world. Since they must respond to a given event, and they do so on behalf of the state, leaders’ social identity is made extremely salient. And if groups must have some sense of how another group will react in order to make decisions, they must examine the leaders of that other group (this does not, of course, mean that their impressions will be accurate). Emotions—and the methods leaders use to convey them, such as language, facial expressions, and body language—are important pieces of information leaders need to make such decisions. Leaders are more likely to rely on knowing how other leaders will react, rather than that of the population as the determining factor, simply because they will know that the leaders matter more for making decisions for the state.

The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States, replacing George W. Bush, highlights all these traits. Despite a short-lived moment of understanding and support from most of the world’s countries in the immediate months after September 11, American economic and trade policies, the
continuing war in Afghanistan, and especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq—for what were considered ill-informed if not outright fictitious reasons—prompted worldwide resentment, frustration, hostility, and anger. As the President, Bush was considered not only the publicly visual representative of the United States, but also the actual decision-maker: anger and even hatred was targeted directly at Bush as “America.”

When Obama as President told the Muslim world in Cairo in June 2009 that he was seeking “a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world” in which the two “share common principles” (Obama 2009), he was widely (and wildly) heralded as inaugurating a new era of American foreign policy vastly different from that of the Bush Administration era and one that would be more acceptable to Muslims and thus celebrated (see Pew Research Center 2009). Obama’s perceived identity as less prone to war and more amenable to negotiation and diplomacy to resolve international conflicts was believed to entail a “better” “American” foreign policy than that practiced under his predecessor. The identification of the leader with the state provides a necessary theoretical pillar to any theory of group emotions in IR.

An understanding of leaders as both decision makers and group members has methodological implications as well. Activation of social identity is more likely among those who can claim to represent and speak for a given identity group to other identity groups; they are, in a sense, heavily “primed” to this end, including by outgroups. Building on the first point above, the existence of outgroups, then, helps to solidify a leader’s social identity, contributing to the individual-to-group identification process. Thus, to trace this emotional process, researchers need not examine the emotions and behavior of every member of the group—they can focus on these state leaders.

Third, and following from the above, state leaders as members of the social group are by their very nature likely to be high identifiers with the group, which enhances their importance as relevant factors in a theory of states-as-groups’ emotions. A critical element of the process of group formation and group emotions emphasized in SIT, SCT, and IET is that “the activation of a social categorization leads to changes in attitudes and behaviors, which become more group-typical for high identifiers” (Seger et al. 2009:465). It may be the case that in kleptocracies state leaders simply care nothing for the state or its citizens and only about advancing their own wealth and power, and it may be the case in authoritarian regimes that regime security shifts concern from the state to the regime. But in most states, and democratic ones particularly, leaders are very likely to be individuals who identify with the state itself. This is why they become leaders—to promote their vision of the state because they view it not as a source of resources but as an entity worth prospering. And indeed, nationalism and patriotism have been shown to matter decidedly for individuals as leaders, including for their policy choices (for example, Bloom 1990; Bar-Tal and Staub 1997; Saideman 2001; Tilly 2005).

The convergence toward prototypical group emotions also means that people who hold these emotions will feel more comfortable with them: they will appear more valid and justified, because they are shared with the group. If so, then the behaviors that flow from these feelings will also appear more legitimate (Seger et al. 2009:466). This is relevant for state leaders because of the difficult, sometimes controversial, nature of foreign policy decisions, particularly ones that directly impact on the population. Leaders who sense they have the emotional consensus and support from citizens will feel, if not emboldened, then strengthened to pursue a given course of action. This may be acutely relevant in foreign policies related to military action. The decision to go to war, and put one’s

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20 Though in both cases, group emotions would still matter, just for much narrower groups.
citizens’ lives at risk, is not casual; but knowing that there is support for such activities could make the decision more likely.

To return to Israel for an example, we can examine the motivations of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in pursuing the 1993 Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Rabin had given much of his adult life in service to Israel, first as an officer in the pre-state paramilitary group, the Palmach, then in the Israel Defense Forces—becoming Chief of Staff during one of Israel’s most critical foreign policy moments, the 1967 War. He then went on to serve as ambassador to the United States (Israel’s most important ally) and twice as Prime Minister. In his second tenure, he committed a revolution in Israeli foreign policy by signing the Oslo Accords with Israel’s longtime enemy, the PLO. Rabin recalled his service as simply a necessary element of his identification as part of the Jewish (then Israeli) people; his memoirs are suffused with mention of this connection (see Rabin 1994). He was, in short, a high identifier with the group.

The decision to sign the Accords was deeply personal to him. To the very end, he disliked working with PLO leader Yasser Arafat; but he argued that the decision, however personally abhorrent, was necessary in the interests of Israel itself (see Sasley 2010:699–701). Although this was clearly his own decision, nonetheless, Rabin’s considerations fits with a public opinion that was increasingly “dovish” and overcoming its long aversion to compromise with the Palestinians, in the context of negotiations and some resolution to the conflict (Auerbach and Greenbaum 2000; Sucharov 2005). It also fit with a growing leftward drift within his own political-institutional home, the Labor Party, which began to feel that in the interests of peace the time had come to consider real concessions toward the Palestinians, even the PLO (Inbar 1991). The combination of all these facets of identification with Israel points us to the key decision-maker—Rabin—as the group member/causal factor in determining the emotional reactions and foreign policies of “Israel.”

Fourth, we must provide definitional rigor in order to effectively trace the emotional transference from individual to group. One of the criticisms often made against models of emotions in IR is that it is not clear “who” is feeling a given emotion and how we can know that emotion matters. SIT, SCT, and IET all argue that a group is a composition of its members. Given the debates over how to define a “state” for the purposes of understanding foreign policy decision, we must specify here who is included in the definition of such a group.

Very simply, it includes all citizens of the state.21 Observers typically classify the public and elites as separate categories, but they are all members of the state-as-group (the specific nature of interaction between these two groups is an empirical question, for specific case study research). When state leaders react emotionally and make foreign policy decisions, they are doing so not as individuals, but as group members who happen to hold decision-making office. In this position, they are different from their fellow group members (the public); but otherwise, leaders and citizens are all equal members of the state whose emotional reactions to international developments converge on the same group emotions.

Groups exist in part by virtue of their members perceiving themselves as such. As discussed above, this entails not just naming a group but is also conditioned on interaction among its members. Self-categorization theory argues that a group requires a particular identity, a social structure, and interdependence among its members (Turner et al. 1987). More specifically, through such member interaction, individuals within the group “become a total functional system,

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21One could also easily argue that non-citizens are important members of the group, given the potential influence they wield on politics and decision making. Think of the non-official immigration population in the United States or the non-citizen labor population in the small Gulf monarchies.
perceptually and behaviourally, producing new whole-properties such as slogans, values, standardized emotional experiences, etc., that take precedence over and change our individual responses” (ibid., 13). Fischer and Manstead have pointed out the affiliation function of emotions for groups. Emotions, in this condition, “can strengthen relations within a social group, enhancing a sense of commitment and belonging. The experience of shared emotion in groups strengthens the bonds between group members and sharpens group boundaries, thereby enhancing loyalty to the group” (2008:462).

Interaction within a state is pertinent to the demonstration of the state as a group. Importantly, groups as “total functional systems” are also open to empirical verification: state leaders interact in a variety of ways with each other and with citizens. They meet with constituents, appear in public or in the media, negotiate with other political leaders, discuss policy with bureaucrats, and so on. Any perusal of daily media in a given country can list these kinds of interactions.

Douglas Foyle’s (2004) examination of President Bush’s shaping and use of public opinion to obtain enough political space, in the aftermath of September 11 and the successful initial assault on Afghanistan, to launch the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provides an example of this process, that is, of the close connections between the public and the decision makers that contribute—indeed, may be necessary in a democracy—to major foreign policy decisions. The evidence suggests that long before the invasion of Iraq, Bush and some of his close advisors intended to “deal with” Iraq (Woodward 2004). But as Foyle points out, it was not possible to convince the public to support such a war until Afghanistan was first dealt with effectively enough. Once this occurred, public opinion seemed open to the idea of a focus on Iraq, but the Administration still had to “sell” a direct confrontation to the population (as well as Congress). It did so by focusing on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and their heightened implications in a post-9/11 era. It made its case through continuing presentation in the media and in public speeches. In this way, as polling data demonstrated, public opinion eventually showed support for Administration policy; leaders’ efforts wrapped the public in a specific ideational embrace, binding the decision makers and the populace together in a foreign policy decision that, while taken by a few specific individuals, reflected the emotional reactions of the group (the United States) as a whole.

Conclusion

Intergroup emotions theory is a useful approach for more rigorous theorizing about emotions in IR, because the psychological studies that support the model underscore that emotions are an element of group decision making. This makes concrete our assumption that emotions are relevant for conceptualizing and communicating about our daily lives, and helping us learn about ourselves, our environments, and how to respond to both. It is also a well-developed model already constructed and used in psychology, supported by considerable empirical testing and evidence, and lends itself easily to adaptation to IR.

This article has demonstrated the utility of using IET to study the emotions of states-as-groups in international politics, but there are several other areas of consideration not dealt with here that warrant mention. First, there must be more empirical application of both IET and emotional frameworks in general in IR. There is a large empirical gap between clinical studies of university students responding to specific questionnaires and state leaders acting and reacting to “real-world” developments. IET researchers themselves are aware of such problems: “Almost all of the research on intergroup emotions … has relied on self-report assessments. Beyond the general concerns that such a homogeneity in methods might raise, the exclusive use of self-report also gives rise to
concerns that participants’ responses in these studies might reflect at worst experimental demands and at best a more cognitive and less affective type of emotion than we were intending to study” (Mackie et al. 2009:293). More systematic study of emotions in IR will also address the concern that most political scientists, including IR scholars, believe emotions to be opposite to and thus inferior to rational cognitive decision-making processes. It would respond to concerns that recent IR work, for example among constructivists, has neglected the role of agency in world politics, such that agents have become “undersocialized” (Aalberts and van Munster 2008:729) with less focus on how structures impact on and condition the behavior of actors. At the same time, IET can help speak to alternate criticisms that emotions-type factors are perhaps relevant to FPA, but not to the broader discipline of IR because they are too unit level (see Hymans’ discussion of Lebow, Hymans 2010:461–462). The intergroup nature of emotions posited by IET directly counters both these points.

Second, much of the work in IET has focused on negative emotions, such as anger and fear; at the same time, much of the emotions’ work in IR has studied similar emotions, such as hostility and humiliation, and both have explored these in negative intergroup environments. Future research can contribute by exploring different emotions and different interstate contexts. Marilynn Brewer notes the relevance of understanding “[t]he fortunes and misfortunes of the group as a whole” (Brewer 2001:306; emphasis added). There are a number of positive emotions that also structure interstate relationships and so deserve more investigation. Booth and Wheeler (2008), for example, have discussed the importance of trust in transcending the security dilemma, but without explicit theorizing the process by which states come to trust. Studies on more positive emotions are necessary to demonstrate that emotions as a causal or constitutive category do matter. (Hymans is, again, a good exception.)

Third, the process by which emotions are transferred from individuals to states should be explored further. IET, building on social identity theory, does this in the context of clinical experiments. Important as they are, these experiments may not represent the complexity of foreign policy decision making, in which leaders must evaluate a host of variables within simultaneous contexts while knowing that decisions will have profound consequences for large numbers of people. I have above laid out some ideas and provided some empirical probes for addressing this issue, but a better understanding of how this transference process works in IR more generally is needed. There is some theoretical tension between the emotions of individual leaders and the emotions of states, and whose emotions are more causal is a question for detailed empirical research. In some cases, it appears that individual leaders matter (Sasley 2010), while other evidence indicates that individual leaders’ emotions matter but primarily in a broader national context (Hymans 2006). Whether this is indeed at one time an individual-level and at another a group-level phenomenon, or whether there are deeper but un-noticed connections, must be teased out.

Fourth, the study of emotions as social elements could constructively be tied to other emerging literatures in IR, in particular the study of language (but also the literatures on memory and imagery). Discourse analysis implicitly underlines the relevance of emotions, but without explicit theorizing. For example, Nicholas Onuf underscores the importance of language to studying IR: “Language is a social activity that depends on speaking subjects (and, in the absence of language, no activity is fully social)” (Onuf 2003:29; his emphasis). Onuf begins to incorporate emotions as part of language: his discussion of agency incorporates

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22See Mercer (2005:92–93, 97). He also makes a strong argument that rationality and emotions cannot be disentangled, because they inform each other (Mercer 2010).
experience, and he briefly references the manner in which infants learn to speak by thinking in valence terms. The theoretical treatment of emotions as part of language is not the concern of his chapter, but one could argue that language devoid of emotions is literally meaningless; the ability to communicate closely involves language and related contacts. Indeed, the very act of communicating highlights the relevant emotions.23 How else can we tell (not show) someone that we love them, or are proud of them?

Fifth, although IET posits that appraisals as cognitive evaluations occur before emotions, there is disagreement on this among psychologists, brain researchers, and IR scholars. How to distinguish between when emotions are the guiding framework and when cognitive processes are is an avenue for further research. The different causal patterns have significant implications for understanding international relations. If cognition comes first, it could provide stronger support for rationalist over other explanations. If emotions pave the way for cognitive appraisals, postpositivists might be in a stronger position to use emotions as a stick with which to beat mainstream IR. Neither of these was my purpose here, but the facts of these implications indicate the seriousness with which we should treat the study of emotions in IR. This also raises questions about the proper methodology to be used in exploring the role of emotions in international interactions, which in turn has implications for the causal-constitutive dichotomy mentioned above. IET provides a foundation for both, if a researcher so wished to emphasize one over the other: Emotions are causal in that they lead a group to particular action tendencies and, from there, to specific behaviors. But group emotions can also be constitutive in the way they are generated by and then structure group perceptions and intergroup relationships.

Importantly, it has been argued in the new journal, Emotion Review (created specifically to synthesize and promote the study of emotions among a range of disciplines, including Political Science), that the social nature of emotions—the capacity for emotions to structure relationships—is underdeveloped and deserving of more study (Fischer and van Kleef 2010). Although the article was concerned with interpersonal emotional interactions, as social psychologists and IET researchers have shown, there is no reason such relationships should not be studied at the group level as well. A better understanding of the social nature of intergroup emotions within IR has considerable potential to join the debate among psychologists, and perhaps even prompt some incorporation of IR theorizing into psychology (including IET), rather than what has been the norm—namely, the other way around.

Research on emotions as determinants of behavior (at both the individual and the group level) is increasing at a rapid rate. Neural scientists, psychologists, decision researchers, sociologists, and non-IR political scientists are paying more attention to the important role of emotions in human decision making. There is much curiosity among IR scholars about the relevance of the topic to their areas of research, but this has not translated yet into enough theoretical and empirical rigor in the context of a substantive literature. My purpose here was to introduce the details of the IET model to IR as a contribution to the still-small emotions literature in IR.

References


23Bleiker and Hutchison (2008:128) assert that this is one of the most promising areas of study on emotions and IR.


